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TO ENACT AN EVIDENCE CODE
Barbara C. Salken*
INTRODUCTION
New York State's law of evidence continues to be governed
largely by cases, despite codification efforts dating back almost
150 years. Complete codes of evidence have been proposed on
six different occasions. The failure of New York, once the leader
in codification of the common law,1 to enact an evidence code is
particularly surprising in light of the momentum toward codifi-
cation that began with the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975 and resulted in the codification of evidence law
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in all but six sister states.2
In 1992, the New York legislature again considered an evi-
dence code. Drafted in 1990, and repeatedly modified to meet
political opposition, the current proposal was designed merely to
codify current New York common law.' Yet, even this conserva-
tive approach failed.
Why has it been so difficult for the New York legislature to
enact a code of evidence? This Article attempts to answer that
question and examines the arguments advanced on both sides of
the issue. Part I traces the long history of the codification move-
ment. Part II examines the current debate. In general, support-
ers of codification argue that New York's common law of evi-
dence is difficult to discover and hard to understand. They
assert that it is applied differently in different courtrooms, is an-
tiquated and is ripe for reform. Opponents argue that the pre-
sent system is working well and should not be disturbed. They
fear that codification will freeze the development of the law or,
worse, subject it to the political process. Identification of the
supporters of codification and its opponents discloses a surpris-
ing alliance of adversaries. Regardless of their specialty, those
members of the bar generally having the burden of proof, both
civil and criminal, enthusiastically support codification while the
defense bar aggressively, and so far successfully, opposes it.
Part II also discusses the merits of each side's arguments.
The result of this examination suggests that the real conflict is
between those who would benefit from the modern trend to lib-
2 Besides New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and
Virginia are the only remaining states without evidence codes. Connecticut is now con-
sidering codification of its law of evidence. State Senator Anthony V. Avallone, Co-chair
of the Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary Committee, has ordered the Connecti-
cut Law Revision Commission to study the feasibility of enacting a state evidence code.
Joseph Calve, Evidentiary Circumstance, CoNN. L. TRES., Dec. 2, 1991, at 13.
Thirty-four states have codified their law of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See infra note 124. Four states have codes that pre-date the Federal Rules:
ALA. CODE §§ 12-21-1 to -285 (1986 & Supp. 1992); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 1-1605 (West 1966
& Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -470 (1985 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:84A-1 to -49 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992). Five states have modern codes that are
not based on the federal model: GA. CODE AnN. §§ 24-1-1 to -154 (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.010-990. (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1992); Mo. Ryv. STAT.
§§ 490.010-710 (1986 & Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6101 (1982 & Supp. 1992);
and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
3 NEW YORK STATE LAW REvISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK XVIII (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E.].
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eralize the admission of evidence, and those who not only oppose
that trend, but fear placing decision-making power in the legis-
lature. New York has been unable to codify its law of evidence
because the defense bar, particularly the criminal defense bar,
does not believe that the legislature will protect its interests. As
with so much else in our society, the question of whether to cod-
ify the law of evidence has become a question of power and
trust. This Article concludes that codification can make the law
more accessible, clarify ambiguities and permit reform and mod-
ernization. But since codification requires legislative action, with
its possible political consequences, it cannot be strikingly inno-
vative. Codification will not prevent change but will shift the fo-
rum for change. The courts' role in developing law will be more
limited and the legislature's role will be more important. There
is little evidence to support opponents' fears that codification
will make the law of evidence a political football. In the end, the
quality of New York's evidence law will be improved with
codification.
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CODIFICATION
Codification is the process by which the whole of a body of
law, be it case law or statutory law, is converted into systematic
form by legislative or executive act.4 The current effort to codify
New York's law of evidence is merely the latest in a long history
of attempts to consolidate and simplify complex bodies of law.
The arguments in this debate have their roots in the ancient
controversy over whether law should be made by judges or
legislators.
A. The European Beginnings
Codification began in France in the early 1800s. France's
successful and popular codification movement grew out of the
chaotic state of its law and became a model for reform." The
need for uniformity and simplicity could not have been greater:
at the time of the French Revolution, there were at least 360
local codes of civil law. In addition, there were two distinct sys-
4 CHARLES WA.REN, A HisoRY op =xm Aamcm BAR 513 (William S. Hein & Co.
1980) (1911). See also CouRTNAY kIEERT, TmE MECHANiCS OF LAW MAMG 150 (1914).
5 ILBFEr, supra note 4, at 153.
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tems of law in the country; the written law, based on the Roman
law, and a substantial body of customary law.6 Each had its own
distinctive features. The written law, which predominated in the
North, was authoritative and individualistic while the customary
law, which predominated in the South, was more humane and
flexible.7 Making matters worse, both of these systems were sup-
plemented, modified or contradicted by three other general sys-
tems: feudal law, canon law and royal ordinances." Finally, all of
these laws were modified by local usage." The pressure to unify
the law was intense. The constitution of September, 1791, or-
dered such unification and by 1804, with Napoleon's support, it
had happened. 10 The Napoleonic Code, as it has come to be
known, was so well received that Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Mexico, Chile and Japan quickly followed suit. Then
Germany enacted its code in 1896, and Switzerland did so in
1907.11 As in France, codification in these countries arose from a
need for unification of diverse and often multiple legal
systems.1 2
Perhaps the absence of any such pressing need explains the
hostility with which the English common law system has greeted
codification. For many centuries England has had one body of
general law while other European countries required codification
to achieve such unification. 3 By the thirteenth century the com-
mon law had already been formed from customary precedents
and was a single system of law for the whole realm.14 In common
law England, the legislature was essentially supplementary; the
unwritten law was added to or modified when times suggested
the need for modernization, but it was not systematically re-
formed or reshaped.15 Nonetheless, the idea of reducing the En-
glish common law to a code goes back as far as the reign of
Henry VII.16 In 1592, Francis Bacon proposed to the House of
6 Id. at 156.
7Id.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 Id. at 158-61.
2I Id. at 153.
12 Id. at 165.
Is Id. at 172.
14 X E. LANG, CODIFICATION IN THE BRrnSH EMPIRE AND AmRiCA 11 (1924).
25 Id. at 21.
16 Id. at 28.
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Commons a plan to amend and consolidate the whole body of
English law.17 In 1653, Sir Matthew Hale chaired a commission,
which included Cromwell, that drew up a plan for law reform. 21
It was not until the close of the eighteenth century and the con-
tribution of Jeremy Bentham, however, that the codification
movement became an important force in England.10
Bentham gave his life to the codification movement. In fact,
he coined the words "codify" and "codification. 2 0 Bentham's
work had an enormous influence: "His bold and insistent attacks
on the absurdities and injustice of the Common Law of evidence
and of the English system of criminal law were the fountainhead
of all the law reform of the Nineteenth Century. " 21 Bentham
wanted to simplify the law, to make it available to everyone and
to eliminate (or at least reduce) the ordinary man's dependence
on lawyers.2 2 Bentham and others were offended by their per-
ception that the law was inaccessible and uncertain.23 The root
of this evil, they believed, was judge-made law which was cre-
ated by individual cases confined to their facts and reported in
numerous volumes stored in libraries and law offices. Bentham
thought that the solution lay in writing law in simple language
and covering an entire field, thereby leaving little or nothing for
judges or commentators to interpret.2'
Bentham's views sparked efforts to codify English common
law. In 1833, William IV appointed a commission to examine
whether to codify criminal law.2 5 After twenty years of revision,
the judges of England did not think that the law was uncertain
or that codification was needed, unanimously rejecting the pro-
posed codification.28 In fact, they concluded that codification
would create the very uncertainty that Bentham sought to elimi-
nate. As a iesult, the government chose not to proceed with the
17 WARREN, supra note 4, at 513.
18 Id. at 513-14.
19 LANG, supra note 14, at 30-31.
20 WARREN, supra note 4, at 513.
2x Id. at 515.
22 JEREMY BENTHAI, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 92-95 (Richard Hildreth trans., Oceana
Pub., Inc. 1975) (1914).
2' See II JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON Juvm muozNcE 620-81 (1911); SEMnoN Amos,
THM SCIENCE OF LAW (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1874).
" BENTHAm, supra note 22, at 92.
23 LANG, supra note 14, at 42.
ss Id. at 42-48.
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efforts to codify criminal law, which had been seen as a precur-
sor to codifying the entire law of England.27 The plan was aban-
doned in 1854, resurrected in 1864, and abandoned again in
1867.
Interestingly, one of the first successful common law codifi-
cations was of evidence law. In 1872, Sir James Fitz Stephen's
Indian Evidence Act was completed. Stephen was a high court
judge and criminal law scholar, and the impact of his code was
enormous. His work is generally regarded as the first successful
effort to codify the law of evidence and is the direct antecedent
of modern codes.28 England's Attorney General Coleridge
quickly requested that Stephen's become a code of evidence for
England.29 Yet Parliament rejected the Stephen code, as it had
all of its predecessors.3 0 Unlike the rest of Europe, there was no
general support for the idea of codification in England. The
judges did not want it, the profession was skeptical, and the peo-
ple knew nothing about it. Although there have been repeated
efforts to codify various bodies of English law, the common law
has stubbornly survived.
B. The Transatlantic Adventure
Bentham's work found a far more receptive environment
across the Atlantic. Here, the codification movement was a re-
sponse to the dissatisfaction of lawyers. In addition, the general
public thought the law inaccessible and uncertain, and many
urged substantive reform.
Immediately after the revolution, the United States found
itself in need of a legal system. Post-revolutionary America
found that discovering and maintaining existing law was not
easy. Statutory law was published in pamphlet form, but the
pamphlets were difficult to find and there were few complete
sets. 1 Moreover, these pamphlets were virtually impossible to
use since they were organized chronologically, not by subject,
2 Id. at 53-54.
28 Josiah H. Blackmore II, The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and
Dilemma, 6 CAP. U. L. REV. 533, 533-35 (1977).
29 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVMENCE iii-iv (3d ed. London, Mac-
Milan 1877).
LANG, supra note 14, at 54-58.
'l CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERicAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 6 (1981).
(Vol. 58:"641
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and lacked indexes. Statutes were frequently amended in later
pamphlets and private laws were interspersed with public laws,
frequently on the same page. This lack of organization made the
statutes effectively unavailable for any practical use.3 2
The common law was equally inaccessible. Decisions were
announced in open court and were unpublished,- leaving the
common law to the memory of the bar. The situation was exac-
erbated because many of the best lawyers and judges had been
Tories who had returned to England, taking their knowledge of
the law with them."
While lawyers complained of inaccessibility, laymen com-
plained in much the same way that the American public com-
plains today. The public felt that the intricacies and complexi-
ties of the law caused substantial injustice. As one critic said,
"those absurd rules of evidence [and] pleadings [were] little bet-
ter than 'gamblings' or 'hazards' that 'changed simple justice
into a professional mystery' and 'contributed to oppression and
plunder rather than happiness and security of the people'. ' 35
Post-revolutionary Americans also resented the expense and
time involved in litigation. A lawsuit was described in a Phila-
delphia newspaper as a "contest of wealth."381 The same newspa-
per complained that "the evasions [in the law] are so numerous,
and by technical forms so established, that the plainest and
most incontestable questions stand for years on the records of
our courts. 37 The lay critic of yesterday, like today, claimed
that the complexities and uncertainties in law were the design of
the lawyer who conspired to keep law as complicated as possible
in his own self-interest.3
The role of English common law was another complication
in creating an American legal system. Continuing English law as
precedent after the revolution was necessary for stability. Yet
much of it was neither appropriate nor welcome in the new
= Id. at 6-7.
3Id. at 8-9.
3 Id. at 9.
Id. at 13 (quoting JESSE HIGGINS, SAMPSON AGAINST= P 'nsriNs 15-16
(1807)).
"Id. (quoting AuRoRA (Phila.), Nov. 9, 1804).
3Id.
"Id. at 14. See also Luke 11:52 ("Woe unto you, lawyers! For ye have taken away
the key of knowledge: Ye entered not in yourselves, and ye hindered them who were
entering in ye.").
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country. While most state governments expressly accepted En-
glish statutory and common law as their law at the time of inde-
pendence,"9 the new governments deemed many portions incom-
patible, excluding them by some general statutory provision.'0
Thus, it was difficult to determine which precedents endured
and which perished.41 By 1820, American law had matured to
the point where statutory law was more available and judge-
made law was reported by private and, eventually, public report-
ers. However, courts continued to use some (but not all) English
law and the general dissatisfaction with the law and lawyers
continued.42
This strong discontent made the United States receptive to
the reform movement already underway in Europe. Since the
most important goal of American law reform was to simplify the
law to make it more available to the people,'3 codification was
the most vigorously promoted reform. Reformers sought to sub-
stitute a general code for the whole of common and statute
law.44 Former colonists saw codification as a tool to resolve con-
flicts and doubts by restating the law in useful, understandable,
modern and clearer terms.45 New York was at the forefront of
this movement.
C. New York and the Codification Movement
By the early 1800s, many of the former colonies were en-
gaged in efforts to revise their statutes. New York, however, pro-
duced the first codification in any common law jurisdiction. New
York's revision was different-even revolutionary because it col-
lected acts that were dispersed throughout the law but related to
a common subject, consolidated them into a single act, reworded
laws to make them simpler and more comprehensible and in
39 COOK, supra note 31, at 10. New York's first constitution declared that "such
parts of the common law of England and of Great Britain and of the acts of the Colonial
Legislature as together formed the law of the colony at the breaking out of the Revolu-
tion in 1775, constituted the law of the State, subject to alteration by the Legislature."
N.Y. CONST., adopted April 20, 1777, quoted in WILLIAM A. BUTLER, THE REVISION AND
THE RvisERs 4-5 (New York, Banks & Bros. 1889).
" COOK, supra note 31, at 10-11.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 24-31.
43 Id. at 65.
" Id. at 70.
45 Id. at 84.
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many instances, modified the substance of the law. Additionally,
New York created entirely new laws to cover previously ex-
cluded areas. 46 Many rules found only in common law were re-
duced to statute form. In some areas, such as property law, im-
portant reforms were achieved and the law transformed. 47 The
revisions, which were completed in 1828,46 reorganized major
portions of the law in a systematic way and reformed significant
substantive areas of the law. The main body of the common law,
however, was left undisturbed.
Several factors made New York preeminent in the codifica-
tion movement. New York's rapid growth as a commercial and
agricultural center contributed to a huge increase in both its
statutory and decisional law. The enormous quantity of New
York law impeded accessibility and certainty, making codifica-
tion more attractive.49 In addition, David Dudley Field, the
spearhead of the codification movement in America, was a New
Yorker.5 0 For forty years he worked as a law reformer, directing
his energies primarily to codifying the law in his state.
As a result of Field's efforts, the New York Constitutional
Convention of 1846 created two commissions: one to codify New
York's substantive law and the second to codify its procedural
law.5 1 Although not an original member of either commission,
Field was quickly appointed to fill a vacancy in the commission
on procedural law. In five short months the commission pro-
duced the initial draft of a procedural code designed as the first
installment of an entire code of remedial law. This partial code,
which'came to be called the Field Code, was enacted by the leg-
islature in April, 1848.2 One historian described it as
tightly worded and skeletal; there was no trace of the elaborate redun-
dancy, the voluptuous heaping on of synonyms so characteristic of
Anglo-American statutes. It was, in short, a code in the French sense,
not a statute. It was a lattice of reasoned principles, scientifically ar-
ranged, not a thick thumb stuck into the dikes of the common law.
4e Id. at 146-47.
47 Id. at 150-51.
48 BuTLER, supra note 39, at 45.
49 CooK, supra note 31, at 131-34.
50 Id. at 186.
51 Id. at 189-91.
This code was formally titled "An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice and
Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of the State." Id. at 191.
53 LAwawaC M. FALRtmA, A HISTORY op AmamcAN LAw 34041 (2d. ed. 1935).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The Field Code was more than a reorganization or revision
of existing law. It entirely redesigned the law of procedure, abol-
ishing the distinction between law and equity, eliminating all
the ancient forms of action at common law and abandoning spe-
cial forms of pleadings. The new code provided for only one
form of action and one method of commencing it." The commis-
sion continued its work and by 1850, had drafted codes that cov-
ered the entire law of procedure, both civil and criminal. 5 Yet,
the new proposals met serious opposition in the legislature. 0
These codes, which included a codification of the law of evi-
dence, 57 were never passed.
Undeterred, Field continued to draft codes, both procedural
and substantive.' On February 13, 1865, codifications of the en-
tire civil and criminal substantive law were presented to the leg-
islature. The work was contained in three codes: a political code,
a penal code and a civil code. " Although the legislature twice
passed the civil code, the Governor refused to sign it.60 After
several attempts, the penal law was finally enacted on July 26,
1881. Although there were further attempts to enact the political
and civil code they all failed largely because of the ardent oppo-
sition of the powerful Bar Association of the City of New York. 1
If Field was the hero of the codification movement, James
C. Carter was its villain.6 2 Writing at the behest of the Bar Asso-
COOK, supra note 31, at 192.
5' LANG, supra note 14, at 127.
" By the time the new installments were presented, enthusiasm for the codification
project had waned considerably. The first installment had not pleased everyone. Many at
the bar were opposed to its experimental nature. Additionally, the original installment
had its flaws. Between its passage in 1848 and its repeal 30 years later, amendments and
modifications enlarged its size nearly ten times over. This effort at revision may have
done more harm then good, since it significantly increased the complexity of the original
project. Some of the difficulty with the Field Code can be attributed to the legislature's
desire to finish it quickly. Completed in little over a year and a half, there was inade-
quate time to consider the many innovations that ultimately were included. COOK, supra
note 31, at 192-94.
57 NEW YORK STATE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 692-789 (1850).
" Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the codification effort, Field persisted. In 1857,
he convinced the legislature to reestablish the Commission on the Code and to include
himself as one of the Commissioners. COOK, supra note 31, at 195-96.
69 LANG, supra note 14, at 139-40.
60 Id. at 145-46.
11 Id. at 146-47.
62 COOK, supra note 31, at 188.
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ciation of the City of New York, Carter argued against codifica-
tion, making many of the same points made today. First, Carter
argued that courts are the superior forum for development of
the law because they decide matters in the context of discrete
and certain facts and seek to "do justice.""3 As such, courts must
have the discretion to decide cases as justice requires, rather
than in conformity with rules created by a legislature that lacks
necessary expertise.6 Second, Carter asserted that codification
would prevent the natural development of the law.05 Third, he
reasoned that codification would not produce the predicted cer-
tainty but would have the opposite effect, creating new issues for
interpretation and new problems for practitioners. Fourth,
Carter argued that the real advocates of codification were the
law professors, who felt the need for structured text, rather than
lawyers and judges, who were involved in the practical adminis-
tration of the law."6 Fifth, Carter argued that the problem was
not with the law, but rather with lack of clarity in the treatises. 7
Finally, he argued against tinkering with a system that worked
reasonably well.6
Notwithstanding the legal community's conservatism, codi-
fication efforts were succeeding across the country. Before the
turn of the century the Field Code had become the basis of
codifications in thirty states and territories. 9 One noted histo-
rian has said of the Field code that it "more than any other stat-
ute on the subject, acted as a catalytic agent of procedural re-
form in the United States."70 Further support for codification
6JAmES C. CARTER, THE PRoPosED CODnTIcATON OF OUR CO.0sN LAW 26 (1884).
"Id. at 9. The legislature was also viewed as untrustworthy and too interested in
the short-run political effects of their actions. FRImDm, supra note 53, at 404.
CARTER, supra note 63, at 30-36.
0 Id. at 72.
" Id. at 73.
eId. at 71.
" Missouri (1849), California (1850), Kentucky (1851), Iowa (1851), Minnesota
(1851), Indiana (1852), Ohio (1853), Oregon (1854), Washington (1854), Nebraska (1855),
Wisconsin (1856), Kansas (1859), Georgia (1860), Nevada (1861), Dakota (1862). Idaho
(1864), Arizona (1864), Montana (1864), North Carolina (1868), Arkansas (1868), Wyo-
ming (1869), South Carolina (1870), Florida (1870) (repealed 1873), Utah (1870), Colo-
rado (1877), Connecticut (1879), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Oklahoma
(1890) and New Mexico (1897). LANG, supra note 14, at 131. The Civil Code was also
accepted in the Dakota Territory, Idaho, Montana and California. They also adopted the
penal and political codes. FRiEDmAN, supra note 53, at 405.
70 FRmDmAN. supra note 53, at 391.
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came as the country became more and more industrial. As com-
merce flourished the need for a more uniform commercial law
grew. By 1900, the Negotiable Instruments Law had been
adopted by many states and the movement for other uniform
laws was well underway.7 1 The American Law Institute began
drafting uniform laws in the early 1900s. In the years since many
uniform codes have been drafted and enacted.72 Although Field's
vision of complete codification of the common law was never re-
alized, codification on a smaller scale has now become wide-
spread.73 Throughout this process the law of evidence has been a
prime target for codification. Ironically, the codification of evi-
dence law has not occurred in New York, despite New York's
position as the early leader in the United States codification
movement.
D. The Law of Evidence
Historically, the rules of evidence played an important role
in the general codification debate.74 Since trials were local
events, often attended.for amusement, the public became famil-
iar with the rules of evidence. The public viewed the rules of
evidence as archaic and irrational and yet another visible exam-
ple of the hypertechnical way lawyers kept the law.75 Accord-
ingly, the rules of evidence attracted Bentham's interest.70
71 Id.
72 Id. at 674. See, e.g., UNWi. PART 'NRsmP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in
1914 and adopted in 41 states); UNIF. LImITED PARTNERSHIP AT, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1985)
(promulgated in 1916 and adopted in 44 states); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A
U.L.A. 427 (1985) (promulgated in 1918 and adopted in 25 states); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS
DEATH ACT, 8A U.L.A. 557 (1985) (promulgated in 1940 and adopted in 47 states); UNIF.
COMM. CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1952 and adopted in all 50 states); UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1985) (promulgated in 1968 and adopted in all 50
states) (amended in 1987); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1969
and adopted in 15 states) (amended in 1992); UNiW. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 Part
H U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1970 and adopted in all 50 states) (amended in 1992);
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1974 and adopted in
four states) (amended in 1992).
73 Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 351, 351 (1969).
74 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, Ja, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
cEmuRE § 5005, at 63 (1977).
75 Id.
7' See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
[Vol. 68: 641
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1. The Early Days
Bentham's early works on codifying evidence were used by
Edward Livingston. In 1830, Livingston wrote the first system-
atic code of evidence for Louisiana.7 7 Livingston sought to con-
trol judicial discretion by making the law simpler and clearer
and to reform the substance of the law. It was a formidable task.
Livingston's code was an early example of the extent to which
some codifiers favored a legislative monopoly over lawmaking.
Livingston sought to limit judicial power by prohibiting judges
from making rules of evidence and requiring judges to stop the
trial and send a report to the legislature if a new rule was re-
quired.78 Not surprisingly, his code was never adopted, but it
sparked interest both in Massachusetts and New York.70
By the turn of the century, New York had tried to enact an
evidence code four times. As noted, David Field was responsible
for the first effort to codify the law of evidence in New York. On
December 31, 1849, a bill was submitted to the New York legis-
lature entitled "An Act to Establish a Code of Evidence.''O This
was the fourth part of Field's code of Civil Procedure and it was
rejected by the legislature."' Thirty-seven years later, the same
bill, with a few minor amendments, was resubmitted. This time
the bill passed the legislature but met its demise at the hands of
Governor Hill.82 In 1887, the legislature again authorized a com-
mittee to draft a code of evidence. Field prepared a code based
on the India Evidence Act. 3 Again the legislature passed the bill
and again the governor refused to sign it. 8 ' In 1900, the legisla-
ture rejected a code of evidence prepared and submitted by the
Statutory Revision Commission, which had been appointed to
consolidate and revise the general statutes of the state.85 This
ended the early attempts to codify New York's evidence law.
7 Id. at 65.
78 Id.
79 Id.
,0 J. BLEacKR Mu ER, AN ARGUPIr m OrasnMoN To Tm PaoPosm CODE Or
EviDEN CE 3 (1886).
81 Id. at 6.
82 Edith L. Fisch, The Feasibility of Formulating a Code of Euidence for the State
of New York, 12 REPORT OF JuDicIAL CoNFE.RENcR or TH STATE oF NEw YoRK 182, 190
(1967).
83 Id. at 190.
4 Id. at 190-91.
" Id. at 191.
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2. Modern Efforts
By the beginning of the twentieth century dissatisfaction
with the substance of evidence law had become more common,
and reform was more frequently urged. Edmund Morgan ob-
served that the "law of evidence is in at least as bad a condition
as was that governing pleading in the day when David Dudley
Field began his crusade."8 Wigmore noted that "the opening of
a new phase in the profession's attitude toward the rules of evi-
dence, viz. a disposition to reconsider the rules' weaknesses, and
a willingness-even a determination-to improve that body of
law in every possible part. '8 7
In 1920, the Commonwealth Fund, one of the first charita-
ble foundations, decided to encourage legal research. One of its
first undertakings was to reform the law of evidence. It formed a
distinguished committee, chaired by Professor Edmund Morgan
and including Dean John H. Wigmore. 88 After more than five
years, the committee issued a report suggesting five changes in
the law of evidence.8 9 Although viewed by some as "the first of a
long line of failures,"90 the report was premised on the notions
that a trial is a search for the truth and that the best way to get
to the truth was to admit more evidence."' This assumption un-
derlies all modern codifications.92 The work of the Fund found
expression in many federal and state statutes. Indeed, it formed
11 Id. at 182 (quoting Edmund Morgan, Codification of Evidence, FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 164 (1949)).
11 Id. at 192 (quoting 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE vii (3d ed. 1940)).
88 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 77. Chief Justice William A. Johnston of
the Kansas Supreme Court, Judge Charles M. Hough of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, Professors Zechariah Chaffee, Jr. of Harvard University,
Ralph W. Gifford of Columbia University, Edward W. Hinton of the University of Chi-
cago and Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michigan, completed the group. Id.
89 EDMUND M. MORGAN ET AL, Tan LAW OF EVIDENCE-SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS RE-
FORM (1927). The suggested reforms were: (1) to create a business records exception to
the hearsay rule; (2) to repeal of the Dead Man's statute; (3) to create of a new exception
to the hearsay rule admitting the statements of an insane or dead person; (4) to restore
the power of a judge to comment on the evidence; and (5) to establish a rule that would
permit a judge to admit evidence without regard to the rules of evidence in essentially
uncontested matters. Id. at xix-xx.
80 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 80.
MORGAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 39.
82 See infra notes 316-19; EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE CODE OF EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE 539, 587, 694, 742 (1941); Jon R. Waltz, The New Federal
Rules of Evidence: An Overview, 1977 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 225, 230.
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the basis for the next step in the evidence reform movement, the
Model Code of Evidence.
3
In 1942, with Morgan as reporter, the American Law Insti-
tute completed its Model Code of Evidence. The Model Code
was in many respects a truly revolutionary attempt at reform.
First, over the strident objection of Dean Wigmore,t" the law of
evidence was reduced to a code that was contained, even with
lengthy comments, in less than 300 pages.96 Second, the Model
Code significantly changed the hearsay rule. Under the Model
Code, hearsay was admissible as long as the declarant was either
present and available for cross-examination or unavailable as a
witness.9" Third, the Model Code permitted the trial judge sub-
stantial discretion, 7 a reform that is most commonly blamed for
the Code's failure.93 In any event, the Model Code of Evidence
was never adopted in any state.99
The next attempt at codifying evidence rules came in 1953,
when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The
Uniform Rules were simple; there were only seventy-two rules
contained in a pocket book of fifty-seven pages.100 Unlike the
Model Code, the Uniform Rules did not seek dramatic reform of
the law of evidence. Rather, their goal was to provide a uniform
law that would be accepted and enacted throughout the coun-
try2° ' It turned out, however, that uniformity without reform
failed to marshall significant interest. As recently as 1953, law-
yers rarely practiced across state lines and so there was less need
for uniformity in evidence than in other areas, like commercial
transactions. In the end, only four states accepted the Uniform
Rules: Kansas (1964), California (1965), New Jersey (1967) and
Utah (1971).102 Yet it would be wrong to say that the Uniform
,3Blackmore H, supra note 28, at 536.
4 See John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A
Dissent, 28 ABA_ J. 23 (1942).
9 WmGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 86.
" MODEL CODE or EvIDENCE 231-34 (1942).
"WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 74, at 88; Spencer A. Gard, The New Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REv. 333 (1954).
WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 74, at 88.
Id. at 88-89.
100 Id. at 91.
101 Id. at 90.
102 CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1-1605 (West 1965); KAn STAT. ANN §§ 60-401 to -470 (1984);
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Rules had no impact; they did become the basis for many of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 3
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence
By the 1950s, the rules under which evidence was admitted
in federal courts were under attack from academic commenta-
tors, the judiciary and the bar.10' There were two principal criti-
cisms. First, there was the problem caused by the source of evi-
dentiary rules. The admissibility of evidence in civil cases was
controlled principally by Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 05 which allowed evidence in a federal court if it was
admissible under federal statute, federal common law or deci-
sions, or under statutes or rules of the state where the district
court sat. The result was that evidentiary decisions within a cir-
cuit were at the least non-uniform and occasionally unfounded
or conflicting. 10 8 Second, reformers insisted that the time had
come to change the substance of evidence law. Since Bentham's
time, many judges, commentators and lawyers had sought re-
form of evidence law.10 7 Commentators argued that it needed to
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-1 to -32 (West 1967); UTAH RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1971). On
September 1, 1983, Utah enacted a new set of rules based on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. New Jersey is currently considering the same path.
103 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 90.
104 See, e.g., Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L.
REV. 560, 580 (1952); Hon. Joe E. Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the
Federal Courts, 24 FIRD. 331 (1960); Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Evi-
dence Rules for Federal Courts, 44 ABA. J. 1113 (1958).
10I Rule 43(a), the most important rule, covered admissibility and competency of
witnesses. Nonetheless, 20 other rules also involved evidentiary questions: Rules 26-37
dealt with depositions and discovery;, Rule 41(b) covered involuntary dismissal; Rule 44
controlled proof of official records; Rule 45 regulated subpoena and service; Rule 50 au-
thorized a party to introduce evidence if the party moved for and was denied a directed
verdict at the close of the opponent's evidence; Rule 59(a) permitted additional testi-
mony on certain motions for new trial; Rule 60(b) permitted admission of newly discov-
ered evidence; Rule 61 was the harmless error rule; Rule 68 made evidence of an unac-
cepted offer of judgment inadmissible; and Rule 80(c) permitted proof of prior testimony
by a transcript. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the United States, Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 89 (1962).
108 See Standards Relating to Court Organization, Standards of Judicial Adminis-
tration, ABA 73 (Handbook, 1961).
107 Thomas F. Green, Jr., Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 177, 178 (1967).
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be clarified 1 and modernized.10 9 The time had come to unify
and overhaul the law of evidence. 10
The real work of developing the Federal Rules of Evidence
began in March, 1961, at a special session of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States"' where a Committee recommended
that uniform rules of evidence be adopted. 22 In 1965, the
United States Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evidence." 3 Four years later the first draft was fin-
ished and, after revisions, was circulated for comments." 4 The
rules were revised in March and October, 1971,110 and Novem-
ber, 1972.116 The November draft was approved by the Court
and sent to Congress." 7 Both houses of Congress then drafted
their own ruleg that, while based on the proposed rules, revised
them in several major respects."" A compromise reached by the
103 Id. at 179. See also Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA L. REv.
213, 214 (1942).
109 Green, Jr., supra note 107, at 179. See also Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword,
MODEL CODE OF EvmE'c 5-6 (1942).
11 Morgan, supra note 109, at 6. See Ladd, supra note 108, at 218.
Morgan, supra note 109, at 75. At that time, the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure recommended that the Chief Justice appoint a committee to
study the advisability and feasibility of formulating uniform rules of evidence for the
federal courts. Id.
I Id. at 77. The committee was chaired by Professor James Moore of Yale Law
School It filed a preliminary report in February, 1962. Id.
223 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The Advisory Committee was chaired by Albert E. Jen-
ner, Jr., a noted Chicago trial lawyer, and included eight practitioners, three judges and
three law professors. The other members of the committee were: David Berger, Hicks
Epten, Robert Erdahl, Judge Joe Ewing Estes, Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr., Egbert L.
Hayward, Dean Charles W. Joiner (subsequently appointed to the federal bench), Frank
Raichle, Herman F. Selvin, Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, Craig Spangenberg, Judge Robert
Van Pelt, Professor Jack B. Weinstein (also subsequently appointed to the federal
bench), and Edward Bennett Williams.
11 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts
and Magistrates, 46 FRLD. 161 (1969).
15 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, Proposed Rules of Evidence (Rev. Draft Oct. 1971).
"I" Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 FIRD. 183
(1972).
227 Id. at 184.
I" The proposed rules had a relatively easy time until they reached the Congress.
There, however, difficulties developed. First, when the rules sent to Congress were com-
pared with the 1971 revised draft, it was discovered that nine of the 77 proposed rules
had been changed by the Judicial Conference at the request of the Kleindienst Justice
Department. These changes were made after the deadline had expired for public exami-
nation of and comment on revisions. Waltz, supra note 92, at 228. Second, Congre:s was
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two houses produced the present Federal Rules of Evidence and
they were finally enacted on January 2, 1975.119
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence led to a
near revolution in the states. One of the hoped-for by-products
of the rules was that states would adopt the final result.20 In
some states drafting projects were undertaken even before the
Court sent the rules to Congress. 121 In 1971, Nevada adopted
rules based on the Preliminary Draft. New Mexico and Wiscon-
sin adopted rules based on the 1972 version, even though it was
being hotly contested in Congress at the time.122 Eleven more
states followed suit in the first years after the Federal Rules
were enacted.1 23 Today thirty-four states have adopted the Fed-
eral Rules. 124
annoyed that the Supreme Court had included a date that would have made the rules
automatically effective in the absence of congressional approval, even though it was au-
thorized to do so under the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Led by a few
influential members, Congress passed a bill that required the affirmative consent of Con-
gress before the rules could be deemed effective. Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure and
Criminal Procedure Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See also
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 102; H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1973). Then the battle really began. The Advisory Committee had been successful in
rejecting the lobbying of special interest groups, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at
102, for instance, the American Medical Association's objection to the elimination of the
doctor-patient privilege. Congress was not. Although a number of special interest groups
entered the fray, the principal battle was waged largely between the Justice Department,
with its list of law enforcement objectives, and liberal members of Congress. Id.
"' Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
120 Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of the
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(1973) (statement of Albert E. Jenner).
121 L. Kivin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Per-
spective, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (1985).
122 Id. at 1318-19.
223 Id. at 1319-20.
I' ALASKA STAT., R. Evm. §§ 101-1103 (1992); AIz. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-
1103 (1992); Api. CODE ANN., R. Evm. §§ 101-1102 (Michie 1992); COLO. REV. STAT., R.
Evm. §§ 101-1103 (1984 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN., R. Evw. §§ 101-1103 (1991); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); HAw. REV. STAT., R. Evw. §§ 101-
1102 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO R. Evm. §§ 101-1103 (1992); IOWA CODE, R. EVID. §§
101-1103 (1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. CoDE Evm. ANN. (West Sp. Pamph. 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN., R. EvID. (West 1991); MIcH. Comp. LAWS, R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992); MINN.
STAT. ANN.,R. EvID. 50 §§ 101-1101 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-1
to -153 (1972 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 26-10-101 to -1008 (1991); NEn. REV.
STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (1988 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020 - 52.395 (1991);
N.H. R. Evm. §§ 100-1103 (1992); NM. STAT. ANN., R EVID. §§ 11-101 to -102 (Michie
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, RuLEs 101-1102 (1988); NJ). CENT. CODE, R. EViD. §§ 101-
1103 (1990-91); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., R. Evw. §§ 101-1103 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit.
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4. New York's Response to the Proposed Federal Rules
New York's first efforts at a modern evidence code substan-
tially antedate the Federal Rules. In 1958, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Practice and Procedure of the Temporary Commission
on the Courts recommended that New York study adoption of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.125 In 1966, the State Judicial
Conference commissioned such a study. 26 It concluded that cod-
ification should be undertaken as soon as possible and should
include a complete substantive revision, not merely a restate-
ment of existing law.127 The Judicial Conference wholeheartedly
endorsed these recommendations and repeatedly (though unsuc-
cessfully) urged the legislature to fund the proposal.2 8 In 1973,
the New York State Bar Association presented to the legislature
a proposal for codification of the law of evidence based on its
own study and report.1 29
Not until 1976, however, did the legislature commit funds to
the codification effort, increasing the allotment of the New York
Law Revision Commission 30 by $65,000.131 The Commission ap-
pointed a team of consultants to research and draft the code and
an advisory panel to screen the product. 13 2 The plan was to use
12, §§ 2101-3103 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 40-010 to -585 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAws, R. Evm. (1991-1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 19-9-1 to 19-18-8 (1987 &
Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN R. Evm. §§ 101-1102 (1990-1991); Tx. CODE AMN. Tax.
Civs R. Evm. and Tax. CaRM CODE EvM. (1990-1991); UTAH CODE ANN, R. Ev7m. (1992);
VT. STAT. ANN. . Evil. §§ 101-1103 (1983 & Supp. 1991); WASh. REv. CODE AN. §§ 5.04-
5.64 (West 1963 & Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE. R. Evw. §§ 101-1102 (1992); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT, R. Evm. §§ 101-1103
(1979).
1M5 Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Proce-
dure, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, at 87-88 (1958).
'2 Stanley H. Fuld, The History and Progress of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 19 N.Y. L.F. 741, 742 (1974).
Fisch, supra note 82, at 194-95.
Fuld, supra note 126, at 743.
19 Id.
The Law Revision Commission was created by chapter 597 of the Laws of 1934,
article 4-A of the Legislative Law. It is the oldest continuous existing agency in the com-
mon law world devoted to law reform through legislation. It consists of five members
appointed by the Governor, each for a term of five years, and the chairs of the Judiciary
and Codes Committees of the New York State Senate and Assembly, as ex officio
members.
231 NEW YORK LAw REvisION CO UNSSION. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COu.MiSSioN IN 1976,
A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1977 N.Y. LAw REv. Co'uWN RE. 10 [hereinafter
1977 N.Y. LAw REv. Cout'N REP.].
212 Id. The consultants were: Jerome Prince, Dean Emeritus of Brooklyn Law
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the Federal Rules of Evidence as an organizational model, but to
look to the Federal Rules, the California Evidence Code and
New York common law for substantive guidance.133 The goal was
to complete the project by 1979.134
In 1978, the Law Revision Commission reported that the
project was on schedule.1 3 5 By 1979, the consultants completed a
first draft. By the end of the year they had completed a final
draft with commentaries, both approved by the Advisory Panel.
West Publishing Company printed and published the Proposed
Code of Evidence pro bono in the 1980 McKinney's session laws
and distributed more than one thousand additional copies to
legislators, judges, lawyers and other interested parties.13 0
The draft code was more dependent on the Federal Rules
than had originally been contemplated. Not only did the draft
code follow the form of the Federal Rules, but it also tracked
their language and the commentaries noted and explained any
differences between the two. Language was sometimes modified
to correct a perceived imperfection in the Federal Rules and oc-
casionally the drafters proposed a rule that was different in
substance.13 7
The Senate and Assembly Judiciary and Codes Committees
held public hearings throughout the state.138 Following the hear-
ings, the Commission and its staff reviewed and revised the
draft. During 1981, in an attempt to achieve consensus, the
Commission met with "each and every person, or groups of per-
sons, or organizations, who expressed a desire to explore the rea-
School; Professor Harold L. Kom of Columbia; Professor Faust F. Rossi of Cornell; Pro-
fessor Travis H. D. Lewin of Syracuse; and Professor Michael M. Martin of Fordham.
The Advisory Panel was composed of Bernard S. Meyer, Chairman (later Associate
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals); Judge Eugene R. Canudo, Court of Claims;
Edward H. Cole, Counsel, Senate Codes Committee; Charles F. Crimi; James Dempsey;
Judge John M. Keane, Surrogate; John F. Keenan, Special Prosecutor, New York City;
William B. Lawless; Douglas McCuen, Associate Counsel to Assembly Majority Leader;
Judge Nathan Sobel, Surrogate; and Judge Paul J. Yesawich, Jr.
133 1977 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP., supra note 131, at 13.
134 Id. at 14.
1I Id. at 9.
,30 NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION IN 1979,
A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1980 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 9.
137 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Trends, Developments, New York Trial Practice: Code
of Evidence, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1980, at 1.
" Id. at 10. Hearings were held in Buffalo, New York City and Syracuse.
(Vol. 58: 641
NEW YORK'S CODE OF EVIDENCE
soning behind Commission proposals."'" 9 The bill was finally of-
fered in the legislature on March 19, 1982, 0 but was referred to
the Codes Committees of each house to be considered as study
bills.141
On January 5, 1983, the bill was resubmitted to the legisla-
ture in almost identical form.142 West Publishing Company
printed, distributed and made available this later edition. Once
more the Senate and Assembly Codes and Judiciary Committees
held joint hearings 43 By then, support for the idea of codifica-
tion was waning and serious difficulties had developed on the
political front. The Senate bill was reported out of the Codes
Committee and advanced to a third reading in the Senate, but
was then recommitted to the Codes Committee. The Assembly
Codes Committee did not report the Assembly bill to the legisla-
ture. The Commission worked on revisions through 1984, at-
tempting to meet the objections of all those who had commented
on any of its provisions. 44 The resulting draft was no more suc-
cessful in either house of the legislature. In 1985, the code bill
was introduced in both the Senate and Assembly. It remained
there, unchanged and without legislative action, until 1988.,1
5. The Current Effort at Codification
In 1988, the Law Revision Commission mounted what may
be the last effort to enact a code of evidence. A working group
was formed, headed by Robert M. Pitler, a Professor at Brook-
lyn Law School.'46 With the support of Governor Cuomo, the
139 NEW YORK LAW REmIoN CommssIoN. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CoWnSSzoN IN 1932.
A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORI, 1983 N.Y. LAw REV. Com'N REP. 8.
140 S. 3375, A. 11279, N.Y. Leg. 205th Sess. (1982).
141 Michael M. Martin, Trends, Developments, New York Trial Practice. Code of
Evidence, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1982, at 1. A study bill is intended for committee considera-
tion and is not offered for enactment
142 Id. at 8; S. 334, A. 332, N.Y. Leg. 206th Sess. (1983).
143 Hearings were held in New York City on February 25, 1983 and in Albany on
March 2, 1983. Martin, supra note 141, at 8.
"" NEw YORK LAw REVISION COMMISION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CoMSS0N IN 1984.
A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YoR, 1985 N.Y. LAw REv. Comm'N REP. 6.
245 S. 2132, A. 2893, N.Y. Leg. 208th Ses. (1985).
1," The working group consists of Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor, Lise
Gelernter, Assistant Counsel; Commissioner Carolyn Gentile, Chairwoman; Commis-
sioner Kalman Finkel; Commissioner Albert J. Rosenthal; Commissioner Robert M.
Pitler, Gregory V. Serio, Counsel to Senator John R. Dunne; Franklin Breselor, Counsel
to Senator Dale M. Volker; Milton Amgott and Michael Garabedian, Counsels to Assem-
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working group spent 1989 reviewing the previous drafts and de-
veloping a new version of an evidence code that sought primarily
to codify existing law rather than introduce changes.141 The new
proposed draft was submitted to the legislature as part of the
Governor's Program Bill in 1990.148 Public hearings were held in
New York City on July 24, 1990. Based on comments and sub-
missions at that hearing, the working group redrafted the propo-
sal and resubmitted the new proposal to the Governor on March
21, 1991.149 Governor Cuomo offered that draft to the 1991-1992
session of the legislature where, despite a more receptive envi-
ronment, it died again in the Assembly Codes Committee. 1 0
Notwithstanding the apparent intransigence of the legisla-
ture, New York is closer than it has ever been to adopting an
evidence code.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE
Since 1976, when it first committed funds to the codification
effort, the New York legislature has conducted three sets of pub-
lic hearings on three different versions of a code.151 Interestingly,
support and opposition to these proposals has remained un-
changed, notwithstanding significant differences in the various
drafts. The principal supporters of codification have been trial
lawyers associations 152 bar associations,15 and, with some reser-
blyman Oliver Koppell; Frederick Jacobs, Counsel to Assemblyman Sheldon Silver;
James Yates, Legislative Counsel to the Speaker of the Assembly; Alyse Gray, Esq. and
Harry Dunsker, Interim Speaker's staff; James Cantwell, Assistant Counsel to the Senate
Majority Leader; and M. Dawn Herkenham, Counsel, Criminal Justice Services. NEW
YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION IN 1988-89, A CoDE OF
EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1989 N.Y. LAW REv. COM'N REP. 282.
147 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E, supra note 3, at xix.
148 Id. at xviii.
149 Id.
10 Telephone Interview with James Yates, Counsel to the Assembly (July 6, 1991).
151 Joint public hearings were held by the New York State Law Revision Commis-
sion, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on
the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee
on Codes. The first set of hearings were held on November 12, 1980 in Buffalo, Novem-
ber 19, 1980 in New York City and December 10, 1980 in Syracuse. The first proposed
draft was reconsidered in light of these and other comments and a new draft was pro-
posed in late 1982. A second round of hearings were held, the first in New York City on
February 25, 1983 and a second in Albany on March 2, 1983. The most recent draft was
commented on at a public hearing held in New York City on July 24, 1990.
'1 See, e.g., Memorandum from the New York State Trial Lawyers Association on
S. 7694 & A. 10557 1 (1990) (on file with author).
[Vol. 58: 641
NEW YORK'S CODE OF EVIDENCE
vations, district attorneys.15 Although there are exceptions,
these proponents are members of the bar who represent parties
that most frequently carry the burden of proof. The proposed
codification has also found strong support within the academic
community.15  The opposition is mainly the criminal defense
bar, joined by civil lawyers who generally represent
defendants.158
An analysis of the principal arguments offered by each side
of the debate reveals that codification will neither produce all
the benefits predicted by its proponents nor realize all the fears
envisioned by its opponents.
,'3 See, e.g., Resolution of the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation (Apr. 27, 1984) (on file with the author); Proposed Code of Evidence for the
State of New York. Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commis-
sion, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on
the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Commit-
tee on Codes 264 (Feb. 25, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings, Feb. 25, 1933] (testimony of
Richard H. Uviller, on behalf of the Bar Association of the City of New York).
14 The position of some District Attorneys has been lukewarm at best. See, e.g.,
Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New
York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary,
Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes,
and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes 102-71 (July 24, 1990) [hereinafter Hear-
ings, July 24, 1990] (testimony of Mark Dwyer on behalf of the New York State District
Attorneys' Association). The District Attorneys have supported tho concept of codifica-
tion but have had reservations about particular draft codes. See id. at 112.
15 See, e.g., Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 128 (testimony of Professor
Stephen Gillers, New York University School of Law); id. at 162 (testimony of Professor
Richard Uviller, Columbia Law School); Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of
New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Sen-
ate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on
Codes 4-5 (Mar. 2, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983] (testimony of Professor
Roderick Surratt, Syracuse Law School); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 36-
37 (testimony of Dean Jerome Prince). But see Proposed Code of Evidence for the State
of New York. Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission,
Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the
Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee
on Codes 562 (Nov. 19, 1980) [hereinafter Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980] (testimony of Ben-
nett Gershman, Pace University School of Law, speaking in support of the common law
system).
10 See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of Gerald
Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers);
James L Furey, Position Paper on the Proposed Code of Evidence by the Tort Repara-
tions Committee of the New York State Bar Association (1982); Letter from David
Siegel, Albany Law School to Edward J. Hart, Chair of the New York State Tort Repa-
rations Committee (Feb. 11, 1984) (on file with the author).
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A. The Arguments in Favor of Codification
All codification movements have begun with the same three
premises: the common law is inaccessible; when discoverable, the
law is unclear and not uniformly applied; and, even when the
law is found and understood, it often needs substantive reform.
The efforts to codify New York's law of evidence are no excep-
tion. Every argument that has been offered to support codifica-
tion of the law of evidence fits into one of these three categories.
1. Inaccessibility
Proponents of codification argue that New York law is diffi-
cult to use because it is difficult to find. Since the law of evi-
dence is only partially judge-made, it is scattered throughout
cases and statutes. Legislative enactments, in turn, are inter-
spersed throughout statutory law. Indeed, it has been observed
that over nine thousand provisions concern evidentiary rules.
1 7
In addition, some rules of evidence are found in both decisional
and statutory law. For example, the hearsay rule and many of its
exceptions, such as admissions or declarations against interest,
are decisional.10 8 Other hearsay exceptions, such as that relating
to business records, are statutory.159 Privileges are statutory0 0
but most of the exceptions to privileges are decisional."1 The
principal advantage of any codification is that it puts all the law,
whether originally judge-made or legislative, in one place, easily
available to all.16
2
Code proponents argue that improved access will improve
157Eugene R. Canudo & Harold Korn, Proposal for Codification of the New York
Law of Evidence, 1973 N.Y. ST. B.J. 527, 528.
158 See Hayes v. Claessens, 234 N.Y. 230, 137 N.E. 313 (1922) (admissions are an
exception to the hearsay rule); Smith v. St. Lawrence County Nat'l Bank, 18 A.D.2d
1042, 238 N.Y.S.2d 585 (3d Dep't 1963) (admissions exception to hearsay rule); People v.
Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978) (declarations against
interest exception to hearsay rule); People v. Thomas, 68 N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293,
507 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1986) (declaration against interest exception), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
948 (1987).
159 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4518 (McKinney 1992).
160 See, e.g., N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R 4502(b) (McKinney 1992) (marital privilege).
101 See, e.g., Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 144 N.E.2d 72, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957)
(marital privilege does not apply to statements aimed at destroying the marital
relationship).
102 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 227 (testimony of Robert Pitler, on
behalf of the New York County District Attorney's Office).
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the quality of evidentiary arguments and decisions.103 According
to them, there is no area of law where the need for ascertaining
accurate information in a short time is as great as in the presen-
tation of evidence. When an objection to evidence is made, the
trial judge must make an immediate ruling. While some evi-
dence questions can be anticipated, most cannot. Thus, argue
proponents, consolidation of all evidence rules in handbook form
will benefit all participants and will result in fewer trial errors,
reversals and costly retrials.1
Opponents respond that New York's law of evidence already
is available in a single volume, citing Richardson on Evidence
and Fisch on New York Evidence.165 There are two problems
with this response. First, of course, these treatises are not the
law, but the authors' distillation of the law. Even conceding that
treatise writers are correct in their summaries, the common law
basis for the treatises does not offer a prospective litigant the
same information as codification will provide. Courts decide
cases based on the facts before them; their goal is not to pre-
scribe the law for the future. A trial court considering an evi-
dence dispute in a common law system must look at the case
offered as precedent. The facts of the current case will not be
identical to those the earlier court had before it and the applica-
bility of the prior ruling will depend on many subtle variables.6 0
Codified law, on the other hand, is prospective; it is designed
solely for future use. The question for courts deciding an evi-
dence question under a code is the meaning of particular words
in the statute. Codification brings the rule of law itself into the
courtroom rather than the holding of various cases. Second,
16 "The proposed code will, if adopted, prove of great service to both the student
who must master the Law of Evidence, and to the judge and trial practitioner who must
apply it on a daily basis." Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 460-61 (testimony
of Richard Rifkin, Deputy First Assistant Attorney General, representing the New York
State Department of Law); see also Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 33 (testi-
mony of Judge William Donnino, on behalf of the Chief Administrator's Advisory Com-
mittee on Criminal Law and Procedure).
18 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 10-12 (testimony of Carolyn Gentile).
JFaoM- PmN=ca RICHARDSON ON EvmFNCE (10th ed. 1973) [hereinafter RicHARD-
SON]; EDrru L, FiscH. FxSCH ON NEw Yoix EvmmcE (2d ed. 1977).
I' Such as, how close are the facts of the prior case to the facts of the current case?
What was the precedent-setting court trying to accomplish? Were there equitable con-
siderations that were instrumental in the prior court's ruling? How important was the
particular piece of evidence to the party seeking or objecting to its admission?
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though of lesser concern, is the difficulty of keeping treatises up-
dated. The current edition of Fisch was published in 1977 and
requires yearly supplements.6 7 Richardson is even older; the lat-
est edition was published in 1972 and has not been updated
since 1985.168
Yet proponent's argument that a code will provide concrete
evidence law is also faulty. The proposed rules are not a codifi-
cation as that term is generally understood. The New York rules
will consist of approximately 100 relatively brief rules compared
to the 401 sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 575
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, or even the 287 sections
of the California Evidence Code. It is apparent that these New
York rules do not constitute a code in the usual meaning of the
term. Instead, these provisions sometimes lay down a black-let-
ter rule,169 sometimes merely set forth a principle,170 and some-
times relegate a matter to discretion or another source of au-
thority.171 Since evidence, like torts, is subject to an infinite
variety of situations, anything more than guidelines would
quickly become unworkable.
At the same time, it is hard to deny that codification will
put the law of evidence in everyone's pocket or purse. The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are available in a 4" by 6" pamphlet of
fifty-five pages.7 2 The New York rules, though slightly longer,
will also be available in compact form. They will not be exhaus-
tive, but will permit all parties to begin a discussion about the
admissibility of some piece of evidence from the same reference
point. If the issue is the admissibility of a medical record, for
instance, all participants will have to decide whether the partic-
ular document meets the requirements of the hearsay exceptions
in proposed rule 803(c)(2) (then-existing mental, emotional, or
physical condition), proposed rule 803(c)(3) (statements for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis or treatment), or proposed rule
803(c)(5) (business records). On balance, it seems indisputable
161 FiSCH, supra note 165.
1' RICHARDSON, supra note 165.
169 See, e.g., 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 605 (prohibiting a judge from
testifying at a trial, proceeding, or hearing at which the judge is presiding).
170 See, e.g., id. § 402 (all relevant evidence is admissible).
" See, e.g., id. § 403 (permitting exclusion of relevant evidence when its prejudicial
effect outweighs its probativeness).
'72 FED. R. EvID. (National Institute for Trial Advocacy 1991).
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that codification will make evidence rules more accessible.
Further, it is critical that trial lawyers have a solid under-
standing of the principles underlying evidence law since eviden-
tiary issues must be recognized immediately, responded to with-
out delay and decided promptly. Yet, anyone who has ever sat in
a courtroom has observed that evidence problems are handled
by the trial bar and bench unevenly at best. Codification can
raise the level of that performance by making it easier to learn
basic evidence concepts. The Code will be a convenient, easily
transportable focus of study for lawyers and law students. As
with the Federal Rules, there will be annotated editions collect-
ing the cases and, as with the current proposal, extensive com-
mentary. Enactment of the Federal Rules in other states has
stimulated much evidence scholarship, including excellent trea-
tises which provide useful materials for educating future lawyers
and practicing lawyers and judges.7 3
Additionally, it is not by chance that evidence professors all
over the country teach evidence through the Federal Rules.17 4 It
is not simply a desire to prepare students for practice in federal
court or to avoid the stigma of localism. The common law princi-
ples of evidence could be the basis of a very challenging and use-
ful evidence course. It is not usually done because it makes
learning evidence harder than it needs to be and harder than it
is under the code. Students, like lawyers, work better with rules
than with judicial holdings because the rules allow them to go
directly to the evidence principle at issue. Learning evidence
from common law cases requires that a student identify the
principle in the holding which is frequently hidden among facts
and dicta. The principle must first be extracted before it can be
examined and its application in new situations considered. Evi-
dence taught from the Federal Rules, however, gives the student
a clearer starting point. The student must still consider the
1'3 See, e.g., Kenneth Graham, State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros
and Cons, 43 OKLA L REv. 293, 312 n.87 (1990), citing 1 1M. UDALL & J. LnOIw.om
ARzoNA PRAcTxc LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1982); C. EHRHAR. FLORIDA EVIENcE (2d
ed. 1984); P. THOMPSON, MuESOTA PiRicnca EvmENcE (1979); L. KIEPATR1CK. OEcON
EVIDENC E (1982); S. GOODE Er AL, GuIDE To THE TEXAS RuLus OF EVIDENCE: CIVII AND
CRnMNAL (1988); K TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRAcnc& EvmENcE (2d ed. 1982). For a dis-
cussion of why inclusion in these treatises is important, see infra notes 195-97 and ac-
companying text.
174 Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the
Goals of Codification, 12 HoFsTnA L REv. 255, 257 (1984).
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rule's application to new facts, but the student can begin with
the rule itself. Obviously, the better one learns evidence in the
classroom the better one will later practice it in the courtroom.
Codifying the law of evidence will enhance this process,17
2. Clarification and Unification
The desire to unify the law has been a powerful and impor-
tant influence in all codification efforts. In fact, codification has
been most successful when uniformity was the primary concern
of reforms."' 6 The law of evidence is no exception. The desire for
uniformity within the federal system and between federal and
state courts has been a principal purpose in the movement to
codify the law of evidence in this country.177 The Federal Rules
themselves were erected from the skeletal efforts originally
designed to provide uniform state laws. 178 In New York, propo-
nents of codification desire uniformity on two different fronts.179
One is uniformity within the state. The second is conformity
within between the Federal Rules of Evidence and New York's
law of evidence.
As to statewide uniformity, proponents urge that evidence
questions are decided at the trial level in an idiosyncratic fash-
ion.18 0 As a result of inaccessibility or ambiguity in the law, indi-
11 I am not suggesting that New York evidence teachers will begin to teach evi-
dence courses based exclusively on the codified New York Rules of Evidence. Rather,
once New York law adopts the language and format of the Federal Rules, both the differ-
ences and similarities will be accessible to teachers and students of evidence law.
178 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
177 Wroth, supra note 121, at 1321. See also Graham, supra note 173, at 298. In fact,
the desire for uniformity has strong roots in American legal history. Uniformity in the
law was one of the stated goals of the American Bar Association when it was organized in
1878 and when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws held
its first meeting back in 1892. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 76. New York itself
had an early interest in uniform state laws. The New York legislature created commis-
sioners to promote uniform state laws before the turn of the century. Id.
17I Wroth, supra note 121, at 1317. The Federal Rules were influenced considerably
by the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, both of
which "had been developed primarily to provide model legislation for state adoption."
Id.
179 Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 460 (testimony of Richard Rifkin,
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General, representing the New York State Department
of Law). See also Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 31-32 (testimony of Dean
Jerome Prince, Senior Consultant to the Law Revision Commission).
180 See, e.g., Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 21 (testimony of Melvin
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vidual trial judges have developed their own rules of evidence.
The consultants and advisory panelists who drafted the 1982
proposed code discovered many instances of such "local rules" of
evidence. s8 Code supporters insist that codification will elimi-
nate these inconsistencies. 82 It is their view that simplifying the
law of evidence and reducing it to a few easily understood rules
will mean that everyone will see the law of evidence through the
same eyes.8 3 To some extent, they may be correct. Codification
can clarify the law, make it more available and eliminate some
of the ambiguities that have developed in cases. Therefore, codi-
fication may help some judges apply the law more uniformly.
But it is too much to expect that an evidence code will turn the
law of evidence into hard and fast rules ow will turn everyone
into evidence scholars.
Proponents second concern with uniformity, however, is
that conformity between New York and the Federal Rules needs
to be given greater consideration. Having a code modeled on the
Federal Rules would enable lawyers to work more efficiently in
both state and federal court and in the vast majority of states
that have adopted codes based on the federal model.'" Using a
code based on the Federal Rules also would permit New York's
law of evidence to benefit from the larger laboratory of federal
courts and states that have already adopted a code following on
Freidel, on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section of the State Bar Association).
181 Report of the Special Committee to Review the Proposed Code of Evidence for
the State of New York, New York State Bar Association 7 (1984) (on file with the au-
thor) [hereinafter NYSBA]; Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 264 (testimony
of Professor Richard Uviller of Columbia Law School, on behalf of the Association of the
Bar of the Ciy of New York).
11 See, e.g., Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 229 (testimony of Peter
Grishman, Administrative Assistant District Attorney on behalf of Mario Merola, Dis-
trict Attorney of Bronx County) ("I think that a Code would provide us with a greater
degree of uniformity among the trial bench.., a Code of Evidence is necessary for us to
get uniformity among the trial bench."); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 264
(testimony of Professor Richard Uviller, on behalf of the Bar Association of the City of
New York) ("In our opinion the codification of our Rules of Evidence will greatly en-
hance the consistency and the intelligibility of our Common Law of Evidence. A number
of rules, which have in their Common Law form remained regrettably obscure are fre-
quently misunderstood, and variously applied by the court.").
183 See Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 5 (testimony of Professor
Roderick Surratt, Syracuse Law School).
118 See, e.g., Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 28 (testimony of Dean Je-
rome Prince); NYSBA, supra note 183, at 8; Letter from Judge Jack B. Weinstein to
Judge Thomas M. Stark, reprinted in Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 493.
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that model.185
The attraction of uniformity, or at least similarity, between
federal and state rules is attested to by the thirty-four states
that have modeled their own laws on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. No state, however, has adopted every provision of the
Federal Rules. New York's reliance on its own common law as
the substantive foundation for most of its rules is not unique.180
A study of state codifications in 1985 showed that two-thirds of
the Federal Rules provisions had been modified when enacted in
various states; only one state had fewer than ten substantial
changes in its version of the seventy-seven rules that make up
the Federal Rules. Most states had many more.187
Yet substantial similarity does exist. All the codes use a
common language, format, organization and numbering system.
All agree on which subjects should be included or excluded from
the code. s8s Even with its express declaration of independence
from the Federal Rules model, 8 9 the proposed code for New
York conforms in these important aspects of uniformity. Such
185 Id; see also Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 515 (testimony of Profes-
sor Arthur Best, New York Law School).
186 See supra note 2.
'87 Wroth, supra note 121, at 1322. Five types of variations were found. Id. at 1322-
24. Interestingly, examples of each of these variations can also be found in the Proposed
New York Code. First, some of the variations were only technical. For instance, state
counterparts had to be used rather than references to federal laws and court structures.
Compare Ma. R. EVID. 402 with FED. R. EvD. 402. For an example of this accommodation
in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 402
with FED. PR Evm. 402. Second, many states have retained what they perceived as tradi-
tional state practice. Compare, e.g., N.H. R. EviD. 611 (b) with FED. R. EVID. 611(b). For
an example in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra
note 3, § 803(b)(3) with FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(D) (admissions by a party's agent or
employee). Third, some states preferred the losing position regarding a matter hotly dis-
puted in the Congress. Compare, e.g., M. R. Evm. 201 (g) with FED. R. EvID. 201(g). For
an example in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra
note 3, § 302 (which adopted the Edmund Morgan-Charles McCormick view on pre-
sumptions originally approved by the Supreme Court) with FaD. R. EvID. 301. (Congress
eventually adopted the more conservative view of presumptions associated with Profes-
sor James Thayer.). Fourth, states sometimes rejected all of the positions that had been
taken in the Congress in favor of their own solution to a controversial issue. Compare,
e.g., VT. R. Evm. 301 with FaD. R. Ev. 301. For an example in the proposed New York
Code, compare 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 806 with FaD. R. EviD. 803(24)
and 804(5). And, lastly, some states included provisions that address issues ignored by
the Federal Rules. See DEL. UUw. R. Ev. 304. For an example in the proposed New
York Code, see 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 202 (determination of law).
Wroth, supra note 121, at 1348.
189 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xxi.
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uniformity, superficial though it may seem, offers two principal
advantages: "(1) it allows lawyers who practice in both state and
federal court, or who have clients in more than one state, to
master only one basic set of rules, and (2) it provides practition-
ers and scholars alike ready access to a single nationwide body
of authority and commentary."' s
Another benefit of uniformity merits serious considera-
tion. 91 Uniformity can provide economies of scale."0 2 Modeling a
code, even to the extent of using the same numbering system,
after one currently in use in three dozen jurisdictions provides
the user with a rich resource. The greater the number of judges,
lawyers and legal scholars who apply the same rule, the more
likely one is to be able to find authority on that point. The body
of law will be richer as well.1 93
Must New York actually codify to benefit from this national
experience? Clearly yes. By modeling its format on the Federal
Rules, the proposed code provides a common vocabulary and a
common approach. It allows New York to join the national legal
community by placing it in the national treatises. If a lawyer in
19 Wroth, supra note 121, at 1322.
191 I find it difficult to worry too much about the ease with which lawyers practice in
different forums. In my experience, most lawyers do not practice in different forums.
Even conceding the obvious, that unifying the law would be helpful to those that do
cross jurisdictional lines, the potential benefit for that group seems too small to impact
meaningfully on the codification debate. See also Graham, supra note 173, at 296. Pro-
fessor Kenneth Graham has noted a number of other advantages to uniformity. First, it
promotes fairness. It seems unfair that a communication privileged in one jurisdiction
would have to be disclosed merely because the plaintiff files suit acrezs the border in a
neighboring state that does not recognize the privilege. Second, uniformity promotes pre-
dictability. Uniformity of evidence law may make outcome determinations more predict-
able for insurance companies or manufacturers. Finally, it will reduce the costs of legal
services in states with insufficient legal representation by permitting lawyers from other
states to fill the supply-demand gap. Professor Graham has even noted that the appeal
of uniformity may be psychological rather than rational:
There seems to be something in human nature that makes us more comforta-
ble going wrong in a crowd, that makes us uneasy when we discover that others
take delight in pleasure we find bizarre or offensive, and that makes the famil-
iar seem safer, if less interesting, than the exotic. Even law professors who
make fun of this foible can probably be found pulling in under the Golden
Arches when travelling rather than taking a chance on Ptomaine Tillie's Truck
Stop. Similarly, the Federal Rules may provide an aura of reliability, rather
like "genuine GM parts," that one does not get from local job shops.
Id. at 300-01.
192 Id. at 299.
193 Id. at 300.
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Minnesota wants to understand an intricacy in Minnesota's law
on dying declarations, the lawyer can look in Thompson's Min-
nesota Practice.""" But the lawyer has other options. The lawyer
can look in Weinstein's Evidence19 5 or in Wright and Graham's
treatise.196 There the lawyer can learn what Minnesota's law is
on that point and also have the laws of sister states to compare,
since these national treatises include the law of all those states
speaking the language of the Federal Rules. But the lawyer can-
not learn what New York's law is on that point. Similarly, the
New York lawyer cannot turn to these national treatises to ben-
efit from the well-spring of knowledge that has developed
around the Federal Rules because New York's law is not there
and does not fit within this framework. Codification can permit
New York to take advantage of those benefits even if it retains
the substance of its law. But it must at least accept the vocabu-
lary of the Federal Rules, even if New York speaks its own par-
ticular dialect.
3. Reform of Substantive Law
The desire to reform the law has helped to drive most codi-
fication movements.1 9 7 New York's earlier efforts to codify its
law of evidence were no exception. 98 According to proponents,
codification provides the best opportunity for revision of out-
dated or otherwise unsound rules."9 The adversary system
places a limit on the extent to which a court can remedy the
deficiencies in present law.200 First, it depends on the court's
sensibilities. Sometimes the court will not act even when it
thinks the rule is outdated and indefensible.2 0 ' Second, common-
law development can only occur piecemeal since the court can
19 P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE (1979).
195 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1990).
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74.
197 See, e.g., LANG, supra note 14, at 74 (codification of Indian Law was motivated,
in part, to improve the substance of that law); IBSERT, supra note 4, at 158-59 (need for
amendment and reform of French law).
198 See, e.g., FISCH, supra note 165, at 185-87; Canudo & Korn, supra note 157;
Stanley H. Fuld, Foreword, 19 N.Y. L.F. 741 (1974).
199 See Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 14 (testimony of Carolyn
Gentile).
"I Id. at 36 (testimony of Dean Jerome Prince).
20' See Loschiavo v. Port Auth., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1983) (agent's admissions).
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only address an issue when it is presented in a particular case.202
Systemic changes or revisions of a complicated set of principles
is simply not possible. 0 3 Codification, however, can make the
needed reforms."' Indeed, all recent codes have attempted to
make some of the suggested reforms.0 5
New York's current proposal, however, is an anomaly. Al-
though proponents of the current draft have urged enactment to
"modernize... clarify... assure reliability and fairness... and
gently push the law along its path"20 6 political pressure has
greatly limited the ability of the drafters to make changes in the
substance of the rules.
The current draft is a concession to the reality that even the
most modern, just and well-drafted code will do New York no
good if the legislature will not pass it. The 1980 draft which in-
cluded many of the modernizations and reforms enacted in the
Federal Rules, such as inclusion of the present sense impres-
sion 2°7 and learned treatise2°s exceptions to the hearsay rule, and
202 Id.
203 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 38; see also Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 485 (1948).
204 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 45 (testimony of Dean Jerome
Prince). The Association of the Bar of the City of New York argued that codification
would necessarily focus the attention of the bar on areas where the common law of evi-
dence offends common sense and saw some rewriting as a good thing. Hearings, Feb. 25,
1983, supra note 153, at 265 (testimony of Professor Richard Uviller); Hearings, July 24,
1990, supra note 154, at 96-97 (testimony of Alton Abromowitz, on behalf of the Com-
mittee on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). The
New York State Bar Association also supports codification because of its potential for
reforming antiquated or unjust rules of evidence. It has argued that the codification pro-
cess gives the legislature the opportunity for reviewing, revising, organizing and bringing
up to date this whole area. NYSBA, supra note 183, at 809. There seems to be general
consensus that reform would be beneficial but no consensus on what that reform should
be.
205 See Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New York under consideration
by The New York State Law Revision Commission, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) (Sp. Pamph.,
West 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Proposed N.Y.C.E.] (permitted admission of declarant's
prior inconsistent statement for substantive purposes); New York Law Revision Commis-
sion, A Code of Evidence For The State of New York, Submitted to the 1932 Se.sion of
The Legislature, Commentary to Rule 601, (Sp. Pamph., West 1982) [hereinafter 1932
Proposed N.Y.C.E.] (eliminated dead man's statute); 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra
note 3, Rule 1003 (duplicates admissible as originals).
208 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xix.
207 "A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the de-
clarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter." 1980 Proposed
N.Y.C.E., supra note 206, § 803(1).
202 To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-exams-
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the restriction of prior bad acts used to impeach a witness to
those bearing on truthfulness, 09 was unable to win legislative
approval. The 1991-1992 draft is based on the assumption that it
will not change current law unless there is good reason for
change.210 As a consequence, it is the most conservative of the
draft proposals and has been less objectionable to those tradi-
tionally opposing codification.2 1 Nonetheless, as this bill is con-
sidered by the legislative committees and examined by the bar,
the pressure to maintain the status quo and resist change con-
tinues. The drafters have been forced even to retreat from some
of the 1990 limited reforms proposed in the original version of
this bill, such as elimination of the often-criticized Dead Man's
Statute. 12 This resistance to change is unfortunate. If the legis-
lature eventually enacts this code New York will not reap the
benefits of many of the lessons that have been learned
elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the New York rules make important and use-
ful reforms. Although some of them are technical and minor,
many are not. For instance, section 1003 modernizes the best ev-
idence rule by permitting the introduction of reproductions in
lieu of originals unless there is a genuine issue as to the authen-
ticity of the original. 13 Modern methods of reproduction have
nation or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine,
or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received
as exhibits.
Id. § 803(18).
209 Id. § 608(b).
110 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xviii.
211 See Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 63 (testimony of Susan
Lindenauer).
112 The Dead Man's statute is a common law principle, currently codified at N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4519 (McKinney 1990), which makes a person or party interested in an
event incompetent to testify to a personal communication or transactiQn with a deceased
in an action against the estate of the deceased. It has been the object of almost universal
criticism for many years. See, e.g., JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 578, 578a (3d ed. 1940);
MORGAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 23-35. It was omitted from the Model Code of Evi-
dence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and almost every modem codification. Also, see
the proposed amendment to the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay
rule to include matters that would "make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or
disgrace... ." 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 804(b)(4); S. 7694, A. 10557, N.Y.
Leg. 213th Sess. 1 (1990).
1'3 See 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 1003.
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eliminated much of the need for strict application of the tradi-
tional rule that requires the original unless it has been lost or
destroyed. This is a significant improvement that will be wel-
comed by New York's courts.2""
The proposal makes some interesting changes in the law of
privilege as well. For instance, section 501(c) changes New York
law by providing that privileged conversations overheard by a
third party without the privilege-holder's knowledge are not nec-
essarily waived.2 15 This makes good sense when the disclosure
would defeat the policies underlying the particular privilege and
when the holder of the privilege took reasonable precautions
against the unauthorized disclosure. The proposed code also ex-
pands the applicability of professional privileges to include those
circumstances when the privilege-holder reasonably believes he
or she is speaking to such a professional but is actually speaking
to someone unlicensed or otherwise not qualified.10
Additionally, the proposed code clarifies some areas of the
law. For instance, the operation of presumptions has been par-
ticularly difficult and confusing. Like most jurisdictions, New
York has many kinds of presumptions that operate in a variety
of ways.217 Proposed section 302 would apply one rule to all pre-
sumptions in civil cases. 218 Adoption of a single method of oper-
ation for all presumptions in civil cases has been favored by
most evidence scholars219 although which rule ought to control
has been hotly debated.220 The drafters of the code resolved the
21" See R.D.D. Enter. v. Eaton Allen Int'l, Ltd., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 14, 1992, at 21, 28
(noting and welcoming the modernized version of the rule in the proposed code).
See 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 501(c).
218 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 504 (attorney-client privilege), § 506
(doctor-clergy privilege), § 507 (doctor-patient privilege).
217 FiscH, supra note 165, § 1193.
2' See 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 302. A uniform rule that would
include criminal cases may be impossible given the constitutional restrictions imposed by
the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979);
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 US. 6
(1975).
219 See EDMUND M. MORGAN, SoM PROBLEMS OF PROOF 76-81 (1956); Edward W.
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Imnmturity, 12 STAN. L. Ryv. 5
(1959).
22 Cleary, supra note 220, at 5; see also EDMUND £L. MORGAN, BASIc PRoRTass oF
EvDENCE 31-44 (1962); Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions
and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 59, 82-83 (1933); JAsS B. THAvm A PRELIM-
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 337 (1898).
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debate by adopting "the so-called 'Morgan view,' giving pre-
sumptions the effect of shifting the burden of proof, rather than
just the burden of going forward, from the beneficiary of the
presumption to his opponent." 2 1 The drafters adopted this rule
both because they agreed with it and because it more closely re-
flected the current operation of presumptions under existing
New York practice.222 The position actually adopted is of less
significance than the fact that a single rule has been selected,
finally offering a glimmer of hope for consistent and understand-
able application in the future.
A number of other reforms are introduced in the code. Sec-
tion 405 permits proof of character through opinion evidence in
addition to evidence as to reputation.223 Section 408 excludes
statements in civil settlement discussions even if the statements
are not hypothetical224 and section 410(d) excludes statements
made during criminal plea discussions.225 Section 607(b) elimi-
nates the ancient "voucher rule" and permits a party to impeach
his or her own witness. 226 Section 804(b)(2) permits the admis-
sion of dying declarations in wrongful death actions as well as
homicide prosecutions.227 These are all changes that move the
law forward and appear to have survived opposition by the most
strident evidence conservatives.
In some areas the code benefits from experience under the
Federal Rules by addressing an overlooked issue, clarifying an
ambiguity or creating an ingenious solution to a problem. For
instance, proposed code section 404(2) expressly permits the use
of character evidence in certain quasi-criminal civil cases, a
growing practice in some federal circuits, 228 notwithstanding the
221 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 302 cmt., at 33. This is in contrast to
the Federal Rules's solution to the problem which adopted the more conservative or
traditional view espoused by James Thayer which merely shifts to the party against
whom a presumption is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or
rebut it. 120 CONG. REc. 11,929-30 (1974).
222 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 302 cmt., at 35.
222 Id. § 405.
224 Id. § 408.
225 Id. § 410(d).
226 Id. § 607(b).
2 Id. § 804(b)(2).
228 See, e.g., Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 826 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding it an error to exclude evidence that plaintiff was not a rube); Croce v.
Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1980) (expert testified that civil defendant's
driver was safe which then justified testimony regarding prior accidents by pilot), cert.
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absence of authority for such evidence in the Federal Rules. The
practice has developed because creating an exception to the gen-
eral prohibition on character evidence for these civil cases, anal-
ogous to that expressly provided for in criminal cases, makes
sense.
Generally the law does not permit evidence concerning a
person's character to prove he or she acted in a particular way
since its probative value is slight while its prejudicial effect can
be great. While it may be true that people's conduct frequently
conforms to their character traits, human experience tells us
that is not necessarily true in a particular instance. Character
evidence tends to divert attention from what actually happened
on a particular occasion, introducing the possibility that the
factfinder will reward a good person or punish a bad person de-
spite the evidence in the case. However, Federal Rule 404(a)(2)
includes a specific exception for the defendant in a criminal
case. 29 This is based on the common law rule that the proba-
tive-prejudice balance is different in a criminal case. Although
knowledge of the defendant's good character may prejudice a
jury in the defendant's favor, the social cost of convicting an in-
nocent person argues for the admissibility of all relevant evi-
dence so the factfinder ought to be able to consider whether a
person of past good character is likely to have committed the
charged offense.2 30 Like reasoning applies in certain civil cases,
such as fraud, since the quasi-criminal nature of these offenses
has the same potential for destroying a person's reputation and
economic status. The proposed New York code, therefore, per-
mits character evidence in a civil case when the underlying cause
of action is predicated on intentional conduct that violates the
penal law.
The proposed code also clarifies a major ambiguity under
the Federal Rules. Rule 803(3) permits a statement of present
state of mind or emotional or physical condition to be admissi-
ble even though it may be hearsay.231 The theory behind this
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Gray v. Sherril, 542 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
found no error in admission of testimony concerning appellants character trait of having
emotional outbursts and of being argumentative).
9 FaD. R. EvI. 404(a)(2).
23 CHARLEs T. McCoRMC, McCoRICK ON EVWDENCE § 186 (John William Stray
ed., 4th ed. 1992).
231 FaD. IL EviD. 803(3).
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exception to the hearsay rule is that the spontaneity and con-
temporaneity of the statement and the state of mind or condi-
tion of the declarant assures its reliability.23 2 The common law
antecedent of this rule arose in the famous case of Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon2 33
The issue in Hillmon was whether a body recovered on
March 17, 1879, in Crooked Creek, Kansas, was John W.
Hillmon or Frederick Adolph Walters. A letter written by Wal-
ters stating his intention to go to Crooked Creek with John
Hillmon was offered to prove that Walters actually went there.
The Supreme Court held that the statement in Walters's letter,
that he intended to go to Crooked Creek, made it more likely
that he actually did go than if there had been no such state-
ment.23  The primary difficulty that has arisen under this provi-
sion is whether the declarant's statement of intent may be ad-
mitted to show what someone other than the declarant did, i.e.,
would Walters's statement be admissible to show what Hillmon
did?23 ' The legislative history on the issue is unclear.23 6 The ma-
jority of courts have admitted such statements to prove the con-
duct of other parties despite uniform disapproval by commenta-
tors.23 The proposed New York code recognizes the danger in
2 FED R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee's note including reference to 803(1).
33 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
234 Id. at 295-96.
233 The language used by the Court supports use of such statements to prove the
conduct of another although whether Hillmon went to Crooked Creek was not really at
issue in the case. The court stated:
The letters in question were competent... as evidence that, shortly before the
time when other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the inten-
tion of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both
that he did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof
of such intention.
Id. (emphasis added).
236 See FED R. EvD. 803(3) advisory committee's note (the rule of Hillmon is left
undisturbed); H.R REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N 7051 (House made clear that statement was not admissible as to actions of
non-declarant).
237 See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d. 353, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (victim in-
tended to meet defendant in parking lot from which he disappeared), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1099 (1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975) (deceased in-
tended to discuss ending business dealings with defendant), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911
(1976); State v. Abernathy, 577 S.W.2d 591 (Ark. 1979) (victim intended to meet defend-
ant); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019 (Me.) (victim intended to travel with defendant),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977), overruled by State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774 (Me. 1985);
contra, e.g., Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21 (D.C. 1980) (victim intended to meet
[Vol. 58:641
NEW YORK'S CODE OF EVIDENCE
the general admissibility of these statements by setting limits on
their use. A declaration of intent to engage in conduct with an-
other to prove the conduct of another person is admissible only
if: the declarant is unavailable and there are other circumstances
that suggest that the statement of intent was serious; it is likely
that someone other than the declarant would engage in the con-
duct; and there is corroboration that the second person actually
engaged in the conduct 38 The proposed New York rule, there-
fore, improves on the federal rule both by explicitly addressing
an ambiguity and by creating conditions that enhance the relia-
bility of the admitted evidence.
Probably the most interesting innovation in the current
New York proposal is its solution to the problem of developing
future hearsay exceptions. The Federal Rules addressed this
problem by creating two identical exceptions to the hearsay rule,
commonly called the residual exceptions or catch-als, which
permit, with notice to the adverse party, admission of hearsay
statements not covered by other exceptions if they have other
guarantees of trustworthiness and if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasona-
ble efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.2 3
The residual exceptions have been criticized for allowing the ad-
mission of "almost any relevant out-of-court statement that
passes muster under Rule 403.' '240 The residual exceptions have
been used to admit such arguably unreliable hearsay as: the
grand jury testimony of accomplices; 241 telexes from governmen-
defendant at location where she was killed not admissible). Compare, e.g., Douglas D.
McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the Judicial Process
After Hillmon, 30 Vii. L. Rnv. 1, 18-27 (1985); John M. Maguire, The Hillmon
Case-Thirty-three Years After, 38 HARv. L. REv. 709, 715 (1925).
1 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 804(b)(5).
23 Fan. R. Evw. 803(24) & 804(5). The only difference between the two provisions is
that the availability of the declarant is immaterial to the former and required by the
latter.
0 Jeffery Cole, Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 16 Lmo. 26, 27 (1989);
see also Faust Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LrnG. 13, 17 (1983).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 US.
843 (1988).
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tal agencies prepared for use in litigation even though the infor-
mation was contradicted by other evidence; 24 2 statements from
defendant's estranged wife to the FBI that she told her husband
of an outstanding arrest warrant;243 an accomplice's unsworn
statements implicating others even though there was evidence
that the declarant had previously lied to the authorities;2 44 and
statements that almost, but not quite, qualify under one of the
enumerated exceptions.248
The proposed New York rule is much more restrictive. In an
effort to provide for further development of the law but protect
against the admission of unreliable evidence, New York's pro-
posed residual exception only permits hearsay that is "within a
definable category of statements" and that is separate and dis-
tinct from the categories set forth elsewhere.2 46 The rule recog-
nizes that the enumerated exceptions do not encompass every
situation that might present reliable hearsay. However, the
drafters did not want to give trial judges broad discretion to ad-
mit any type of hearsay that might appear reliable in a particu-
lar case. The drafters thought that
vesting trial judges with virtually unlimited and unreviewable discre-
tion. to admit so-called reliable hearsay will lead to the admissibility of
unreliable evidence, a lack of uniform application, and most impor-
tantly, an absence of meaningful review by the Court of Appeals
which has limited power to review discretionary determinations,
mixed questions of fact and law, and virtually no power to review fac-
tual determinations. 247
The code envisions the development of future hearsay excep-
tions such as an exception for learned treatises, but expressly
precludes admission of a statement that almost, but not com-
pletely, meets the requirements of an enumerated exception.248
242 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1049 (1989).
242 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1988).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 844 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
867 (1988).
245 See, e.g., Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350-51 (7th Cir.) (calendars admitted "as statements 'by a
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy' "), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
241 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 806.
14 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 806 cmt., at 233-34.
248 Id. at 234.
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The proposed New York code expressly provides that these de-
terminations are questions of law, thereby assuring review by
the New York Court of Appeals, and limits applicability of the
residual exception in criminal cases to statements of an unavail-
able witness, being mindful of constitutional confrontation con-
cerns. 2 9 All in all, it is an ingenious solution to a difficult
problem.
B. The Arguments Against Codification
Defense lawyers consistently oppose codification. Although
the criminal bar has been the most conspicuous, it has not been
alone. 250 The civil defense bar, when identifiable as such, has
also opposed codification.261 Just as modern supporters of codifi-
cation renew historical arguments, opponents' arguments mirror
those raised by their intellectual and political predecessors.
Opponents make four principal arguments against codifica-
tion. First, there is no need for a code because the present sys-
tem is working and is superior to anything that can be achieved
by codification. Second, codification will freeze the development
of the law. Third, any given proposal vests too much discretion
in the trial judge. Fourth, codification will politicize the law of
evidence.
1. No Need for a Code
Opponents argue that New York has a long and proud tra-
dition of common law development of rules of evidence, and that
the proponents of codification have not established a need for
abandoning the current system.2 2 Unlike the federal system
249 Id.
11o See, e.g., Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 290-96 (testimony of Archi-
bald Murray, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note
153, at 287-310 (testimony of Eric Seif, on behalf of the New York Criminal Bar Associ-
ation; Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 130-34 (testimony of Peter McShane,
bn behalf of the New York State Defenders' Association).
251 See, e.g., Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New Yorh: Joint Public
Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing Committee
on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing
Committee on Codes and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes, 84-93 (Nov. 12,
1980) [hereinafter Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980] (testimony of I. William Larson); id. at 94-
117 (testimony of Frank Raichle); id. at 118-27 (testimony of Alexander Cordes); Hear-
ings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 51-71 (testimony of Jim Furey).
252 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 56 (testimony of Jim Furey, on behalf
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before the Federal Rules were enacted, traditionally New York
has not been troubled by inter-circuit and inter-district conflicts.
The New York Court of Appeals has been a leader in developing
the law25s3 and opponents of codification find nothing unclear 2 4
or inaccessible 255 about New York's common law of evidence.
They also maintain that a code with commentary will be no
smaller than Richardson on Evidence256 or Fisch on Evidence.2
Moreover, every practicing attorney knows where to find the law
of evidence.258 As Judge Phylis Bamberger has argued, codifica-
tion may be an extreme remedy for a minor ill:
Finding statutes and relevant cases governing evidentiary principles is
a task no different from finding the statutes and other authorities rel-
evant to any other legal subject. The same tools are available. It is
generally presumed that law school has at least taught the method for
researching the law. If education is the intent of the proposal, it would
be accomplished by simply distributing the proposal without its en-
actment by the legislature.259
Opponents also fear codification will result in extensive and
expensive appellate litigation.260 The reasoning is as follows: the
law is now well defined and once the legislature enacts a code,
even one that merely codifies current law, courts will have to
review each rule to decide whether the legislature intended it to
of the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar Association); see id. at
245 (testimony of Archibald Murray).
2'3 See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 5 (statement of Sheldon
Silver, Chairman, Assembly Codes Committee); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153,
at 246 (testimony of Archibald Murray); Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 58
(testimony of Edward Nowak, on behalf of the Public Defender of Monroe County).
2 Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 163 (testimony of Joseph McCarthy);
Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 131 (testimony of Peter McShane, on behalf
of New York State Defenders' Association).
"I See Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 39-40, 45 (testimony of Gerald
Lefcourt).
SRiCHARDSON, supra note 165.
FisCH, supra note 165.
Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 39-40 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt);
Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 184 (testimony of Edward J. Hart); Hearings,
Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 163 (testimony of Joseph McCarthy).
25 Phylis Skoot Bamberger, Let's Think Before We Leap: Why Should the Law of
Evidence Be Codified?, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1992, at 1, 7.
"0 See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 64 (testimony of Susan
Lindenhauer, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society.); id. at 131 (testimony of Peter
McShane, on behalf of the New York State Defenders' Association); Hearings, Feb. 25,
1983, supra note 153, at 197-200 (testimony of Edward J. Hart).
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be the same or whether the rule has been changed in some way.
Thus it will be years before the law of evidence is settled
again.261 Additional drawbacks envisioned by opponents are the
expense involved in codification and the time and effort required
to learn the new code. One lawyer has calculated that learning
the new code will consume forty-five years of judges' time and
fifty million dollars' worth of attorney time. 6 2
Opponents assert that proponents have not demonstrated
that trial judges and trial lawyers have difficulty learning and
using the law of evidence263 or that the law needs to be simpli-
fied, modernized or clarified.26" They insist that codification vill
actually create many of the problems that its supporters seek to
avoid. 65 In some ways they are right. Proponents of any change
have the burden of providing a reasonable basis for adopting the
suggested reform. But to maintain that the law of evidence in
New York is beyond improvement or that it is a subject that is
easily learned and used is clearly wrong.
Codification is not a panacea. Learning the new code will
take time and have its costs. Working with the new code will
raise questions as well as provide answers. No law of evidence
can be specific enough to provide easy, automatic solutions to all
evidence issues. The law of evidence must be flexible enough to
accommodate the enormous variety of situations that real life
presents. Nor will there necessarily be fewer appeals. No new (or
old) body of law can avoid appellate litigation. Courts must in-
terpret the words and reveal the policies behind the rules. Oppo-
nents to codification are correct that the code's text will not be
all there is to the law but that, of course, is true of all statutory
law. Courts will continue to have a role and judicial opinions will
continue to shape the rules.
Ultimately, opponents have overstated the problem. The
current proposal does not create an entirely new body of law
261 See Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 185 (testimony of Edward J.
Hart, Chairman of the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion). Interestingly, the Law Revision Commission has argued that it would be financially
beneficial to enact a code. The cost of retrials as a result of evidentiary errors that could
be eliminated by a code will reduce the waste of time currently in the s)tem. Id. at 11-
12 (testimony of Carolyn Gentile).
262 Id. at 57-58 (testimony of Jim Furey, Corporate Defense Fund).
2 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
28 See part LA.
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that must be learned and defined. Rather, it codifies the current
common law unless there is an "express and unequivocal indica-
tion of legislative intent to do" otherwise.26 The cost of learning
the new law is well worth the benefits achieved through codifica-
tion. The question is not whether codification will make the law
of evidence perfect, only whether it will make it better. On this
proponents have met their burden of proof.
2. Codification Freezes the Law of Evidence
Opponents fear that codification will stop further develop-
ment of evidence law since after codification courts will no
longer be the vehicle for growth and change.6 New privileges,
hearsay exceptions and doctrines not yet dreamed of will no
longer arise from that thoughtful process of slow, case-by-case
consideration by trial and then appellate courts.
Opponents concede that courts will continue to interpret
the law, but point out that judicial consideration of statutory
law is very different from the development of common law.
Common law courts apply judicially-created rules to known facts
and conditions with the hope that justice will be served in the
individual case. Judicial opinions deciding individual cases are
generated by adversarial litigation. Opponents argue that law
that arises from a real dispute between known litigants is more
likely to produce justice. Moreover, common law courts are vir-
tually unlimited in their power to fashion remedies or create
rules.2 68
Once the law of evidence is codified, however, different rules
will apply. Courts will not create but only interpret the law.
Such statutory interpretation is limited to a few well-defined
principles. If the words of the statute are unambiguous, a court
must enforce the provision.269 If the words of the statute are am-
biguous, a court must seek the intent of the legislature. 70 Oppo-
nents argue that it will no longer be possible for a court to create
2" 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 102.
267 See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of Gerald
Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys).
2 Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
269 N.Y. STAT. LAW § 76 (McKinney 1991).
270 N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92 (McKinney 1991).
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new doctrines or abandon outmoded ones. If the legislature
had wanted to change the law in certain areas, so the argument
goes, it would have done so. Since it did not, courts will be more
hesitant to make future needed changes. As a result, the law of
evidence will be the poorer.
Further, opponents argue that the law of evidence should be
made by courts and not legislators because "it is largely a matter
of logic and experience. It is based on determining facts by
drawing reasoned inferences from information relevant to the
fact determined. '2 72 This, of course, is what courts do.
Archibald Murray of the Legal Aid Society, a leading oppo-
nent of codification, agrees that the law of evidence ought to be
developed by courts, reasoning it is sui generis, neither substan-
tive nor procedural. Murray concedes that substantive law, be-
cause it must reflect policy considerations, and procedural law,
because it should be clear and uniform, are the job of the legisla-
ture.27 1 The law of evidence, however, does not implicate public
policy concerns, according to Murray. While general guidelines
are important, Murray argues that the law "must remain flexible
enough to adapt to the unique factual circumstances of each
case."2 74 Murray sees the judiciary as experts in the trial process
and feels that the legislature should intervene only when public
policy or uniformity are important.27 5
Finally, other opponents argue that codification of the law
of evidence will further overburden an already stretched legisla-
ture276 that has neither the time nor expertise to monitor prop-
erly the proposed code to guarantee that justice is done.27 7 Op-
ponents' fear that codification will restrain the development of
the law has merit. After all, the role of the judiciary in interpret-
271 Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
272 Id. (citing JAi s THAYFA A PaLmnNARY TRArisE ON EvIDNcE AT CO!,laON LAw
265, 275 (1898)).
7 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 246-48 (testimony of Archibald Mur-
ray). See also Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of Gerald Lef-
court, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys); but
see id. at 131 (testimony of Peter McShane, on behalf of the New York State Defenders'
Association).
1' Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 247 (testimony of Archibald Murray).
275 Id.
2" See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of Gerald
Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys).
277 Id. at 131.
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ing a statute is more limited than when it is deciding a case on
common law principles s.2 7  However, the argument is based on
two premises. First, common law development is healthy and
permits the law to mature and grow. Second, once the legislature
prescribes the law of evidence, the case-by-case evolution of the
law will cease, stifling growth and change. Both premises are
questionable.
Common law development of the law of evidence has left
much to be desired .2 7 New York's common law system provides
a classic example of the slow pace of judicial reform.2 80 For in-
stance, New York is one of seventeen states that continue the
antiquated voucher rule which prohibits a party from impeach-
ing a witness it has called.8 Courts are bound by precedent and
their natural conservatism. Opponents are looking to the wrong
forum if development of the law is their goal.
Of course, codification will prevent common law develop-
ment in some areas. The drafters made choices that will require
legislative action to reverse. For instance, proposed rule 608(b)
permits impeachment with prior specific instances of miscon-
duct that bear on a witness's credibility.2 12 This language is
broader than that adopted in Federal Rule 608(b) which limits
.78 Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
2179 We end, as we began, with the observation that the law regulating the offer-
ing and testing of character testimony may merit many criticisms. England and
some states have overhauled the practice by statute. But the task of moderniz-
ing the long-standing rules on the subject is one of magnitude and difficulty
which even those dedicated to law reform do not lightly undertake.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1948).
280 ALA. CODE § 12-21-163 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Amz. R. EVID. 601 (1992); COLO. R.
Evm. 601 (1984 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West 1992); IDAHO R. EvID.
601(b) (1992); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-201 (1992); IND. CODE § 34-1-14-6 (1992);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-210(2) (Baldwin 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-
116 (1985); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5-930 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op.
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1992); TEm I. Civ. Evw. 601(b) (1990-1991); VT. R.
EvD. 601 (1983 & Supp. 1991); WASH. R. EvID. 601 (1963 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. R. EvID.
601 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.01 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
281 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO R. Evw. §607
(1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14 (Bums 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.487 (West 1967);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233 § 23 (West 1959); MICH. R. EvID. 607 (1992); N.J. R. EVID.
20 (1976 & Supp. 1992); OHIo R. Evw. 607 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-403 (Michie
1992); Castillow v. Browning Ferris Indus., 591 So. 2d 43 (Ala. 1991); State v. Smith, 82
A.2d 816 (Conn. 1951); Poole v. State, 428 A.2d 434 (Md. 1981); Hall v. State, 165 So. 2d
345 (Miss. 1964); Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986); State v. Gomes, 604
A.2d 1249 (R.L 1992); State v. Anderson, 406 S.E.2d 152 (S.C. 1991).
82 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 608(b).
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such inquiry to prior specific instances of misconduct that bear
on the truthfulness of the testimony.283 The code has been criti-
cized for adopting what is a minority position.2 It is correct
that the choice to retain New York's common law rule forecloses
any hope of the New York Court of Appeals reversing its long-
held position in this area.28 5 The price of codification is that in
some circumstances courts will not be the vehicle for change.
This does not mean that the law can never change. But in these
areas, it will have to be the legislature that acts.
Despite these substantive choices and the shift to the legis-
lature as the final decisionmaker, the code will not stop the de-
velopment of the law. There will still be judicial opinions that
move the policy or operation of a provision forward incre-
mentally. Inevitably there also will be decisions that consider
novel questions. As new evidentiary questions arise, courts will
decide them. Codification will not stop this process.
Since the Federal Rules were adopted, courts have contin-
ued to develop the law of evidence in all of these ways. For ex-
ample, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey28 the Court made new
law based on policy considerations. There, the Court considered
for the first time whether the exception to the hearsay rule for
public investigatory reports (803(8)(C)) includes conclusions or
opinions contained in the reports.287 After determining that
neither the language of the rule288 nor the legislative history280
was dispositive, the Court considered the policy behind the
Rule's "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony" 290 coupled with the practical difficulty of
" RED. R Evm. 608(b)(1).
2" Professor Bennett L. Gershman, Address at the New York State Bar Association
Criminal Justice Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 30, 1992).
2 See People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N..2d 637 (1950). However, there is no
reason to think that the court of appeals was likely to make this change. In People v.
Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 514 N.E.2d 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1987), the defendant sought to
have the court reconsider its rule. The court respondech "Our holding today neither re-
treats from that precise holding [in Sorge] nor casts the slightest doubt on the correct-
ness of the more general evidentiary principle it confirms." Id. at 293-94, 514 NY.2d at
869-70, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
2" 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
2Id.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 164-65.
"0 Id. at 169.
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drawing a clear line between fact and opinion,291 and admitted
the opinion.
Common law courts sometimes make law when they con-
sider how a rule ought to operate, such as establishing the ap-
propriate burden of proof for admitting a contested evidentiary
fact.292 Courts will do the same kind of law-making after codifi-
cation. Huddleston v. United States' 3 is an example of judicial
resolution of such a procedural rule. Like the common law, Fed-
eral Rule 404 generally prohibits the admission of character evi-
dence suggesting that a person will or did act in a certain way
because the person acted that way in the past.2 9 4 As does the
common law, the Federal Rules recognize that such evidence
might be admissible for some purposes.2 95 The rule does not
specify what degree of proof of prior acts is required or whether
the court or the jury is to decide the point. In Huddleston the
Supreme Court held that the trial court need not decide whether
"the government has proved the act by a preponderance of the
evidence" but need only consider "whether the jury could rea-
sonably find the conditional fact ... by a preponderance of the
evidence."2 6 This contrasted with the overwhelming majority of
circuit courts which had held that the substantive question was
for the court and the burden of proof was by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.2 97 Although Huddleston has been criticized 29 8 and
291 Id. at 168.
292 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 503 N.E.2d 485, 510 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1986) (defendant's commission of an uncharged crime must be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence before it can be offered on the issue of identity in a prosecution for an
unrelated offense).
29 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
29 Professor Jonakait has argued that Huddleston is an example of the limitation
codification places on judicial law-making. Randolph N. Jonakait, Plain Meaning and
the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 Tax. L. REv. 745, 752-55 (1990). He argues that the
Court in Huddleston felt constrained by the plain meaning of the statute and the intent
of the drafters to reject a rule that would better serve federal evidence policy. Id. at 755.
Without disagreeing with Professor Jonakait on the merits of the rule actually adopted, I
think he argues from wishful thinking. There is nothing in Huddleston that suggests that
the Court was not completely satisfied with the rule articulated or would have adopted
some other rule if left to its own devices. Although the Court does evaluate the issues
using traditional statutory construction criteria, the Court clarified a procedural rule and
made law by concluding that the adopted standard conformed to the policy structure
behind the Federal Rules.
:95 FED. R Evw. 404(b).
296 485 U.S. at 689-90.
2 See Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. O'Brien, 618
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was rejected by the drafters of the proposed New York code, it
illustrates a court developing law under a code.
The greatest need for growth of the law arises when devel-
opments in society present new legal problems. For example, the
use of hypnotism to refresh a witness's testimony only has be-
come an issue since the enactment of the Federal Rules. There is
no provision in the Federal Rules that explicitly addresses the
admissibility of such testimony. Rule 601 provides that "[e]very
person is competent to be a witness" 209 Since hypnotically re-
freshed testimony simply was not an issue when the Federal
Rules were being considered, neither the plain meaning of the
rule nor its legislative history suggest a basis for excluding this
type of testimony. Yet codification has not prevented courts
from creating new rules to deal with new problems. The majority
of federal courts apply a balancing approach, permitting the wit-
ness to testify if the in-court testimony of a previously hypno-
tized witness has a basis that is independent of hypnotic influ-
ence.300 Regardless of whether one agrees with the particular
rule courts have created, it is clear that codification has not
stunted the law's growth or the court's ability to deal with this
new situation.
Even conceding that courts will be unable to act in certain
ways once the law is codified, there is no reason to think that the
law of evidence cannot be changed or amended by the legisla-
ture. Legislatures are far more responsive in the first place to
the need for change than are courts. Judicial change requires a
case with the right issue, a party who recognizes it and a court
that is willing to risk an unprecedented ruling. Additionally, the
dispute must be important enough or, in civil cases, the parties
rich enough to appeal. Even if those conditions are satisfied,
there is no assurance that the litigation will produce the desired
F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fredrickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cr. 1979);
United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1977).
"s See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. Ray.
447, 498-505 (1990); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and
Innocence: Rules 404(b) 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EoyY L. J. 135 (1989).
2" FmD. R. Evm. 601.
300 Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 Loy. LA. L. Ray.
909, 915 (1972). See, e.g., United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 198),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023 (1987); Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 441 (4th Cir.
1986); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 US. 1010
(1986).
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change.
By contrast, genuine problems in the law can be taken to
the legislature and dealt with directly. In 1978, Congress re-
sponded to just such a problem. Rule 412, frequently called the
rape-shield law, was added to the Federal Rules, precluding the
routine admissibility of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct in
prosecutions for sex offenses.301 The rule was enacted to en-
courage reform of existing rape laws.302 During the discussion in
the House of Representatives, Representative Mann argued:
Mr. Speaker, for many years in this country, evidentiary rules have
permitted the introduction of evidence about a rape victim's prior
sexual conduct .... Such evidence quite often serves no real purpose
and only results in embarrassment to the rape victim and unwar-
ranted public intrusion into her private life. The evidentiary rules
that permit such inquiry have in recent years come under question;
and the States have taken the lead to change and modernize their
evidentiary rules .... The bill before us similarly seeks to modernize
the Federal evidentiary rules.303
Similar provisions have been adopted in most states, including
New York.30 4 No state developed this doctrine by case law.
Codification will not prohibit the law from developing.
Courts will continue moving in their traditional incremental
fashion, permitting the law to grow and change. When the com-
mon law process is inadequate, the legislature, can act again.
3. Codification Permits Excessive Judicial Discretion
One of the more paradoxical objections to codification is the
fear of judicial discretion, since such an objection directly con-
tradicts the claim that evidence law should be made by judges
with their special expertise. All of the modern codifications
adapted from the Federal Rules of Evidence give a significant
amount of discretion to trial judges. The drafters of the Federal
Rules included broad discretionary rules to allow for continued
development in the law. They feared that non-discretionary evi-
dence rules would preclude further growth and prevent on-the-
301 Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(2), Oct. 28, 1978.
302 TRIAL EVIDENCE COMMrITEE, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 71 (2d ed. 1991).
"01 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978).
304 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM PRoc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); see also IDAHO R. EVID.
412 (1991); ME. RULES OF CouRT § 412 (West 1992); MIss. R. EVID. 13-1-412 (1992).
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spot flexible decisionmaking that the trial process requires.305 In
fact, the argument has been made that the Federal Rules are
misnamed and that "[t]he drafters of the Federal Rules did not
consider them as rigid rules to be mechanically applied, but
rather as flexible principles for both trial and appellate
courts."30
6
Opponents of the current New York proposal have not ex-
pressed the same level of concern about judicial discretion as
they have about previous drafts, 0 7 which frequently were criti-
cized for removing predictability and guidance by giving too
much discretion to trial courts.306 Critics perceived the trial
bench as so poor as to require explicit rules to prevent errors.30 9
Further, such errors would be very difficult to correct since ap-
pellate courts, which rarely write evidence opinions in the first
place, would feel even more constrained if the standard of re-
view were abuse of discretion rather than the higher de novo
standard applicable to statutory interpretation.3 10
Articulated objections about the scope of judicial discretion
in the proposed code seem to mask a deeper concern about the
result of that discretion's exercise. For instance, the Legal Aid
Society has most recently argued that
[t]o the extent that the draft considers the problem of judicial discre-
tion, in our view it oscillates between forbidding any judicial develop-
ment... [and] granting an il-defined and overbroad latitude through
the use of a catchall provision in the hearsay article. Beyond this, at
least three provisions of the proposed code appear to increase the like-
I'l See Margaret A. Berger, An Introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2
LITIG. 8 (1975); see generally Craig Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Euidence-At-
tempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1061 (1969).
101 Thomas Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IowA L REv. 413, 415 (1989).
"° The current movement away from this objection is probably the result of the
current code's having been redrafted to reflect existing New York law, which does not
permit the admission of as much evidence and a recognition of the somewhat schizo-
phrenic nature of the argument.
30 See, e.g., Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 96, 102 (testimony of Frank
Raichle); Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 528 (testimony of Eric Sieff, on
behalf of the New York Criminal Bar Association); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note
153, at 60 (testimony of Jim Furey); Hearings, March 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 63
(testimony of Jim Hartman).
11 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 296 (testimony of Eric Seifi); Hear-
ings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 97, 102 (testimony of Frank Raichle).
I10 Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 297-98 (testimony of Eric Seiffl); ef.
Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 64 (testimony of Jim Hartman).
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lihood of judicial involvement in the presentation of evidence at trial.
* * * These various provisions encourage judicial intervention in the
evidentiary process without providing adequate recognition of the
dangers of that intrusion, the weakening of the adversary system, the
displacement of the jury as the finder of fact and the loss of appear-
ance of judicial impartiality.311
This concern was expressed in the context of a much larger
and more general theme that runs throughout the Legal Aid po-
sition, i.e., that "the drafters have opted for admissibility over
reliability. '" 12 For opponents of codification who, as defendants'
attorneys, are often trying to keep evidence from being admit-
ted, the increase in admissibility associated with increased judi-
cial discretion is a serious problem. The preference for common
law development reflects a belief that without a code the modern
trend toward admitting more evidence can at least be contained.
This same concern was one' of the objections expressed
when the Federal Rules were enacted and was repeated as states
adopted codes based on the federal model.3 13 Grants of discre-
tion have been equated with increased admissibility. As one
commentator described it:
Three words describe the direction in which the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence have taken us: discretion, creativity, and admissibility. The
codes give abundant discretionary power to the trial courts. The
judges add a sizable measure of interpretive creativity. Greater admis-
sibility has resulted.3 14
That codification along the federal model has broadened admis-
sibility is not seriously debated."1 5 But at the same time, the
311 Hearings, July 24, 1991, supra note 154, at 70. The provisions are sections 201,
611(a) and 614(a) & (b).
312 Id. at 69 (testimony of Susan Lindenauer).
313 See, e.g., Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 33 FED. B. J. 21, 29-30 (1974); Richard S. Walinski & Howard Abramoff, The
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 344, 367-
86 (1978).
314 See Rossi, supra note 241, at 13.
318 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 314, at 21 (perhaps the predominant theme is a
"bias in favor of admissibility"); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097, 1118 (1985)
("[M]ore evidentiary material is being turned over to the factfinder under the Federal
Rules of Evidence than would have been in cases tried at common law."); but see
Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REv. 413, 413 (1989) ("Given a decent amount of flexibility, a trial judge may
exclude-as easily as admit-evidence.").
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modern trend in evidence well before the Federal Rules has been
toward greater admissibility. 36 The historical exclusionary rules
reflected the nineteenth century distrust of the jury and were
established to keep unreliable and misleading evidence from the
jury's consideration. 31 7 As respect for the jury's ability to evalu-
ate evidence has increased, the desire to protect jurors from po-
tentially unreliable evidence has declined.318
The criminal defense bar opposes codification because it
thinks that increased admissibility will work against its clients.
As one commentator has noted, this is probably true in two
respects:
(1) It makes it more difficult for the defense to rely on the prosecu-
tion's inability to meet its burden. Greater admissibility means it is
easier to put in evidence to meet the burden.
(2) A cutting down of exclusionary principles hurts the defense be-
cause some judges administer exclusionary rules in a way favorable to
the defense. These judges exclude prosecution evidence but not de-
fense evidence because only exclusion of defense evidence or admis-
sion of prosecution evidence carries any risk of reversal, owing to the
fact that no appeal lies by the prosecution.-"
The defense bar's concern is understandable, particularly in
light of the dramatic increase in the power of the American
prosecutor in recent years3 20 which has enlarged the role of the
trial as the final bulwark against government overzealousness.
Now, more than ever, the reliability of admitted evidence must
be guaranteed.
Although the argument has merit, other considerations
make it less persuasive. The combination of a trend in the law of
evidence away from protecting the accused and the movement
toward greater admissibility of evidence, even without codifica-
tion, suggests that the criminal defense bar cannot protect itself
310 Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 ABA. J. 507, 580-81
(1938); Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence,
89 U. PA- L Rv. 145, 155, 161 (1940); Edmund M. Morgan & John U. Maguire, Looking
Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 923, 931 (1940); Mason Ladd,
Modern Thinking Upon Evidence-A Model Code, 17 TEwN. L Ray. 10, 12, 20 (1941).
317 Ladd, supra note 317, at 216.
318 Jack Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U. L Ray. 517,
522-23 (1977); 1 JACK B. WEmsTmN & ARGARLE A. BFRGEa, WWsraN's EvWI.CE ill
(1990).
"I Rothstein, supra note 314, at 26.
uo Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L, Rav. 393 (1992).
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by defeating codification alone. The judicial trend against the
criminal defendant is obvious. Rising public concern about crime
has manifested itself in a growing victim's rights movement that
has reduced judicial protection of the accused.32' This trend was
apparent in the Supreme Court even before enactment of the
Federal Rules322 and continues with increased momentum to-
day. 23 Lower courts are even more sensitive to public pressure:
there is little that is more disconcerting to a trial judge than to
find his or her name on the front page of the local paper because
of a pro-defendant decision.
Public concern with crime is not the only influence on the
law of evidence. New York's common law system already has
been greatly affected by the Federal Rules, even without codifi-
cation.32 4 The trend toward admissibility reflected in the Federal
Rules is very much a part of New York's common law. 2 5 New
York courts frequently cite the Federal Rules when deciding evi-
321 See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, Does it Matter Who is in Charge of Evidence Law?, 25
Loy. L-. L. REV. 649, 658 (1992) (discussing the effect the victim's rights movement has
had on criminal defendants in California).
322 See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at line-ups re-
quired only after indictment); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (government must
prove confession was voluntary only by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
beyond a reasonable doubt); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (approving non-
unanimous verdicts.)
32. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (involuntary confession
can be harmless error); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith exception
to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
(public safety exception to Miranda). New York courts have been more protective of
defendant's interests. See, e.g., People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 529
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1988) (refusing to adopt the Supreme Court standard for probable cause);
People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1985) (rejecting
good faith exception); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419 (1976) (New York provides greater protection to defendant's right to counsel than
the federal Constitution).
'24 See, e.g., Borden v. Brady, 92 A.D.2d 983, 984, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (3d Dep't
1983) (Yesawich, J., concurring) ("By permitting reliable but otherwise inadmissible data
to serve as a basis for an expert's opinion, the [C]ourt [of Appeals] was harmonizing the
New York law of evidence with the Federal rule now found in rule 703 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.").
325 See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 34 N.Y.2d 458, 459, 309 N.E.2d 875, 876, 354
N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1974) ("[I]t is observed that this court has in recent years emphasized
that the hearsay doctrine has been too restrictively applied to exclude otherwise reliable
evidence from the jury."); People v. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 349 N.E.2d 841, 384 N.Y.S.2d
741 (1976) (modifying New York rule to permit admission of specific acts of violence on
issue of justification in homicide prosecution).
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dence questions.2 8 For instance, the Second Department of the
Appellate Division recently decided that a lay witness who had
not been an eyewitness to the crime could express his opinion
that an individual depicted in a photograph was the defendant.
The court stated:
Although no New York cases directly stand for the proposition that
non-eyewitnesses may be called on the People's direct case to identify
the defendant from a photograph of the crime scene, in a number of
Federal and State jurisdictions such testimony has been allowed, al-
beit in some instances in reliance upon general statutory provisions
which expressly permit lay witnesses to render an opinion with re-
spect to the determination of a fact in issue. Many of the State stat-
utes are modeled after Federal Rules of Evidence rule 701 .... 3"
This trend toward admissibility even includes the development
of new exceptions to the hearsay rule. The New York Court of
Appeals has recently recognized a present sense impression ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay, relying on the Federal
Rules.328
Admittedly, the common law of New York is currently less
liberal than that under the Federal Rules. Yet whether or not
New York codifies its law of evidence, the bias toward admissi-
bility is here to stay. Ironically, if there is a hope for reducing
the effect of this liberalization movement, it may be in the pro-
cess of codification itself. The current draft both retains many of
the provisions helpful to the criminal defense bar 32  and offers
some improvements over current law.330 One of the code's more
3" See, e.g., People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 169, 385 N.E2d 612, 620, 412
N.Y.S.2d 874, 883 (1978); People v. Watson, 100 A.D.2d 452, 464, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978, 986
(2d Dep't 1984).
1 People v. Russell, 165 A.D.2d 327, 332, 567 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (2d Dep't 1991),
azf'd, 79 N.Y.2d 1024, 594 N.E.2d 922, 584 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1992).
" People v. Brown, No. 34, 1993 N.Y. LEXIS 91 (N.Y. Feb. 18, 1993).
l' See, e.g., 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 104(b)(2)(C) (requiring that
before a co-conspirator's statement can be admissible, the prosecution must prove the
existence of the conspiracy without the benefit of the statement itself in contrast to the
Supreme Court's holding in Bourially v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) and section
104(b)(3)(A), which provides for a higher standard of proof before uncharged crime evi-
dence can be offered than is currently required under the Federal Rules.). See Huddle-
ston v. Unites States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
"" See, e.g., 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 404(b)(1) & (b)(2). They re-
quire the offering party to give notice of uncharged crimes evidence before it can be
admitted; and section 410 prohibits the admission of statements made during plea
negotiations.
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important innovations is rule 803(c)(iii), which permits a party
to argue against admissibility of an otherwise admissible hearsay
statement because it is not sufficiently trustworthy. This provi-
sion permits courts to exercise discretion in limiting admissibil-
ity and thus offers the defense bar the opportunity to use its
adversary skills in a broad range of circumstances.33 1 Addition-
ally, a persuasive argument can be made for a number of innova-
tions or improvements that actually help the criminal defendant.
It may be that the drafters would welcome genuine efforts to
improve the law if the defense bar were serious about consider-
ing a code and engaged in the negotiation process with the view
of ultimately supporting codification. 3 2
4. Codification Politicizes the Law of Evidence
Finally, there exists the fear that codification will subject
the law of evidence to political influences which will almost cer-
tainly hurt the criminal defendant. No matter how good an en-
acted code of evidence, the argument goes, within no time the
legislature will riddle it with piecemeal amendments.
The Legislature, whose members must stand for election every two
years, would be even more likely than the courts as a result of a strong
District Attorney lobby to do what is perceived as politically popu-
lar-which generally coincides with the prosecution's point of
view-rather than purely what best serves truth-finding and the ends
of justice.333
In other words, the defense bar fears that prosecutors will lobby
Albany annually and will succeed in changing the law of evi-
dence to increase admissibility at the expense of reliability. 3 4
331 See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 1984).
33' For instance, Professor Robert Pitler, the principal author of the current propo-
sal, has indicated that any future drafts of the proposed code would include an amend-
ment to rule 403. The rule currently provides for exclusion of relevant evidence if "its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that its admission would cre-
ate undue prejudice to a party . . . ." Professor Pitler is prepared to delete the word
"substantially", reasoning that evidence which would create undue prejudice simply
ought not to be admitted whether the prejudice is substantial or not. Professor Pitler has
been convinced of the wisdom of this change through discussions with Professor Randolf
Jonakait, Professor of Law at New York Law School, a long time opponent of codifica-
tion. Telephone conversation with Professor Robert Pitler (Sept. 1, 1992).
1 Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 131-32 (testimony of Peter McShane,
on behalf of New York State Defenders' Association).
I" Id. at 36-38 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt).
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Worse is the fear that the legislature will respond to every
unpopular verdict. The argument was most directly made by at-
torney Gerald Lefcourt, speaking for the New York State Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers in his prepared statement for
the joint public hearings on the proposed code:
Unfortunately, the legislature by its nature and obligations cannot be
as immune [as courts] to public opinion. This Association fears that
making evidentiary rule-making the business of the legislature will in-
evitably infect the process with political currents. Legislators re-
elected every two years will understandably be influenced by public
opinion and the interests of their constituents. Just as every year
there are dozens of proposals to enhance sentences and create new
crimes in response to public opinion, we see a future of countless an-
nual proposals to change evidentiary rules in response to unpopular
cases and judicial rulings. We fear annual lobbying days with pressure
placed on legislators to enact rules simply to make convictions easier
or circumvent Court of Appeals decisions disfavored by law enforce-
ment or other groups. We see the threat of labeling lawmakers "soft
on crime" for opposing these efforts.3-
Lawyers who represent those accused of crime believe they have
a better chance in a courtroom before a single judge than they
could possibly have before the legislature. 36 After all, criminal
defense lawyers do not represent a group that is either powerful
or popular. They do not trust the legislature to protect their cli-
ents from the growing victims' rights movement they believe is
tilting the scales against the criminal defendant as the move-
ment increases the visibility and power of the crime victim. 3 7
The criminal defense bar's fear that the law of evidence will
become hostage to public opinion is the most pervasive and in
some ways persuasive argument against codification. Although
the argument has an emotional ring to it, it is not irrational.
Legislatures do act in response to public pressure. Criminal de-
fendants do not have a lobby in the legislature. In New York, in
. Id. at 9 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (on file with the author).
I Id. at 36 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt on behalf of the New York State Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers); id. at 132 (testimony of Peter McShane, on behalf
of the New York State Defenders' Association).
Swift, supra note 322, at 657-60. Ironically, these same lawyers believe deeply
that judges, too, favor the prosecution. Yet their confidence in their own persuasiveness
makes them more comfortable in a forum where they individually have a voice.
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particular, crime is a primary political concern.3 38 For example,
in 1978, the legislature passed the Juvenile Offender Act 339 with-
out public debate in special session3 40 during an election year in
the wake of a sensationally publicized murder committed by a
fifteen-year-old boy. 41 The Act dramatically altered New York's
approach to the administration of juvenile justice, making it one
of only ten states that vested original jurisdiction over very
young teenagers in criminal courts. 42
The New Jersey legislature recently reacted to a horrified
public in exactly the way opponents fear. Arthur Seale was
charged with the lurid kidnapping murder of Exxon executive
Sidney Reso. Seale's wife, Irene, pleaded guilty and agreed to
testify against her husband. However, New Jersey retained a re-
strictive spousal immunity privilege . 43 Although the prosecutor
thought he could secure a conviction without Mrs. Seale's testi-
mony, he went to Trenton and introduced a bill to modify the
statute. 44 A week later the bill passed. 45
The Federal Rules have not been immune to this phenome-
non. In 1984, after John Hinkley was acquitted, by reason of in-
sanity, of trying to kill President Reagan, Congress amended
Federal Rule 704. Rule 704 had abolished the common law rule
that prohibited experts from commenting on the ultimate issue
33 See State of the State Message of Governor Mario Cuomo for 1990 & 1991, re-
printed in 1990 N.Y. Laws 2544, 2545, 2559 (McKinney); 1991 N.Y. Laws 2110, 2191
(McKinney).
"' 1978 N.Y. Laws 869 (McKinney).
340 Mara Thorpe, A Critical Perspective, 15 TRIAL 27, 29 (Jan. 1979).
341 In July, 1978, Willie Boskett killed two subway passengers and attempted to kill
a subway motorman. Prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent, the only alternative at the
time, Boskett was sentenced to five years in a Division for Youth Facility. The Boskett
case made front page news and the legislature was under a great deal of public and
political pressure to enact a tougher New York juvenile crime law. The Juvenile Offender
Act was passed a few days after Boskett was sentenced. Harlan A. Levy, Violent
Juveniles: The New York Courts and the Constitution, 11 COLuM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 51,
52 (1980). See Richard J. Meislin, Carey, In Shift, Backs Trial In Adult Court For Some
Juveniles, N.Y. TI Es, June 30, 1978, at Al (the second headline read: "Discloses Stand
Following 5-year Sentence Given to Youth, 15, for 2 Subway Murders").
'42 Barbara Salken, Down the Up Staircase: Due Process and Removal from Crimi-
nal Court, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 643, 670-72 (1981).
343 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-17(2) (Rule 23).
34 Henry Gottlieb, Murphy's Law: A Nebraska Professor and a Senator Are Help-
ing the Prosecutor in the Reso Case, 131 N.J. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 1.
340 Henry Gottlieb, Seale Gets New Lawyer, Again, 131 N.J. L.J., July 27, 1992, at 8.
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in a case.38 Prompted by public reaction to the jury's verdict,
Congress resurrected the restriction for experts testifying with
respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case.347
It thus is valid to question whether these notorious exam-
ples warrant abandoning the codification effort. Yet closer look
at the experience in the states suggests not. Ten of the thirty-
four states that have codified their law after the Federal Rules
have done so by legislative enactment.34 8 The following discus-
sion is limited to those ten states in which the legislature was
responsible for the enactment of, and therefore amendment to,
the rules of evidence.3 49
With the exception of Nevada 350 the rules of evidence were
amended rarely: Louisiana and North Carolina have amended
none of their provisions;351 Arkansas and Hawaii have one
amendment each; 52 Oklahoma has four amendments;3 13 Iowa
'46 This rule was premised on the notion that opinions on an issue that might be
decisive of the outcome of a dispute invaded the province of the jury. The rule proved to
be unworkable and was condemned by legal scholars and judges. See WEnus=N & BER-
GER, supra note 196, § 704 [01].
'4' Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-93
(1983), cited in Anne Lawsor Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule:
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CoPNuL L. REv. 620, 620
n.1 (1987).
Act of Apr. 13, 1987, No. 876, 1987 Ark. Acts 2096; Act of June 23, 1976, 1976
Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws cl. 556; Act of 1980, No. 1827-80, 1980 Haw. Sas.
Laws 244; Act of Jan. 28, 1983, ch. 219, 1983 Iowa Acts 713; Act of July 8, 1983, No. 515,
1988 La. Acts 1085; Act of May 22, 1975, No. 279, 1975 Nab. Laws 528; Act of Apr. 22,
1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nay. Stat. 775; Act of July 7, 1973, ch. 701, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 666;
Act of May 10, 1978, ch. 285, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 801; Act of Aug. 22, 1981, ch. 892,
1981 Or. Laws 1374. In the remaining twenty-four states, the law of evidence was codi-
fied by judicial promulgation. See, e.g., 7B C.R.S. Rules of Evidence 651 (1980 & Supp.
1990); 50 M.S.A., Evid. 3 (1980 & Supp. 1991) and 17A A.R.S. Rules of Evid. 3 (1980 &
Supp. 1991). Since there are restraints on the power of the legislatures to amend the
rules in at least some of those jurisdictions, analogy to New York is inappropriate. See,
e.g., Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990) (striking down KS 421.355
which had created an exception to the hearsay rule for child witnees as usurping the
power of the judiciary to control procedure.)
-"' In addition to these 10 states that legislatively enacted their evidence laws, I
have also looked at the evidence codes of Alabama, Arizona, Mississippi, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Kansas, Michigan and Minnesota. I found no better evidence to support the "legis-
lature run amok" theory in those states.
See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
See LA. CODE Evm. ANN. (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-1 (1988).
2 AR. R Evm. 803(25) (1985 & Supp. 1992) (Arkansas added a new exception for
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five; Nebraska six;355 Florida56 and Oregon fifteen and four-
child witnesses to its rule against hearsay, rule 803(25)); HAw. R. EVID. 408 (1989 & Supp.
1992) (Hawaii amended rule 408 to include statements made during mediation proceed-
ings as inadmissible evidence); HAW. Ray. STAT. § 23G-15(8) (1985) (Hawaii made gender
terms neutral when such change would not alter the meaning of the statute).
3 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2103 (1986 amendment corrects a typographical error),
§ 2503 (1980 amendment alters limitation on doctor-patient privilege where patient re-
lies on medical condition as an element of his claim or defense), § 2615 (1988 amend-
ment prevents exclusion of the victim of crime from courtroom), § 2803.1 (amendment
creates an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of child victims of sex crimes)
(West 1978 & Supp. 1992).
I In 1985, Iowa Rules 601, 611 and 803 were amended; in 1987, Iowa Rule 410 was
amended and in 1990, Iowa Rule 601 was amended a second time.
35 In 1978, Nebraska amended Rule 407 to include manufacture or sale of a defec-
tive product in its definition of negligence [Laws 1978, LB 665, § 7] NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-
407 (1985). In 1982, Nebraska amended Rule 705 to delete a provision that provided for
interrogatories for expert witnesses in civil matters. [Laws 1982, LB 716, § 2.] NEB. REv.
STAT. § 27-705 (1985). In 1984, Nebraska amended Rule 404 to prohibit the use of repu-
tation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of the victim of a sexual assault
[Laws 1984, LB 79, § 2] NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-404 (1985); it amended Rule 505, its marital
privilege, to permit a spouse to testify against the other spouse in any criminal case
where the crime charged is a crime of violence [Laws 1984, LB 696, § 1] Nan. REv. STAT.
§ 27-505 (1985); and it amended Rule 1101 concerning the courts in which the Rules are
applicable [Laws 1984, LB 13, § 46] NEB. Rav. STAT. § 27-1101 (1985). In 1988, Nebraska
amended Rule 504, its doctor-patient privilege, to make clear that communications be-
tween patient and doctor are not privileged as to obtaining controlled substances unlaw-
fully. [Laws 1988, LB 273, § 1 and LB 790, § 1] Nan. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (Supp. 1992).
'" In 1981, Florida amended Rule 509 to protect communications that were privi-
leged when made but were not covered by the code. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.509 (West 1979
& Supp. 1992). Rule 606(3) was amended to change the wording but not the substance
regarding interpreters for deaf persons. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.606 (West 1979 & Supp.
1992). Rule 801 expanded the definition of hearsay. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801 (West 1979
& Supp. 1992). In 1983, Rule 503(5) was added creating a sexual assault-counselor privi-
lege. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). In 1985, there were minor
changes to Rule 605 (deleted the term "young" in front of the word child and inserted
"or the duty not to lie"). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.605 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). Rule 606
was expanded to provide interpreters to children and mentally or developmentally dis-
abled persons as well as non-English speaking persons. FLA. STAT. ANN, § 90.606 (West
1979 & Supp. 1992). Rule 803(23) was added creating a new hearsay exception for child
witnesses. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). In 1988, Rule 602 was
technically modified creating a change in the dead man's statute substituting the term
"mentally incompetent" for the formerly used term insane. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.602
(West 1979 & Supp. 1992). The remaining seven changes, all adopted in 1990 include:
expanding the definition of psychologist in Rule 503 to include employees of certain state
facilities, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); amending Rule 404 to
allow the accused to offer evidence of pertinent character traits of the victim, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.404 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); rewording Rule 606(8) to allow reasonable in-
terpretation-but was not substantively changed, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.606 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1992); changing Rule 608 to expand the ability to impeach, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.608 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); changing Rule 616 to provide for the removal of a
witness from the courtroom to prevent overhearing other testimony, FLA. STAT. ANN.
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teen respectively. 57 A code's age has something to do with the
number of amendments, but that is not the whole story. Al-
though both of the states with no amendments recently adopted
their codes and Nevada, the state with the most amendments,
has the oldest codification,358 the state with the second oldest
code, Arkansas, which adopted its code immediately after the
Federal Rules were adopted in 1976, has only amended one of its
code's provisions.359 Oklahoma and Nebraska, the states with
the next most senior codes, show only four and six amendments
respectively.360
Even the experience in Nevada, which has amended provi-
sions of its law at least 106 times,36 ' provides no support for op-
ponents' fear of politicization. The amendments to the Nevada
Evidence Code suggest not that Nevada has a runaway or reac-
tionary legislature, but rather that Nevada has an inefficient leg-
islature. Indeed, most of these changes have been minor and do
§ 90.616 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); amending Rule 803(19) to modernize the language
replacing the term "legitimacy" with "parentage", FL. STAT. ANM § 90.803 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1992); and changing Rule 804(c) to remove the ban previously imposed on the use
of a co-defendants statement to inculcate, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804 (West 1979 & Supp.
1992).
-7 Oregon amended Rule 511 to limit the counselor-client privilege by allowing the
client or the one responsible for him to waive the privilege, On Ray. STAT. § 40.280
(1991); Rule 503 (lawyer-client privilege) was amended by altering the definition of a
representative of the client, 0. REv. STAT. § 40.225 (1991); Rule 504 was amended to
limit application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege; Rule 504(1) made the same
adjustment to the physician-patient privilege; Rule 504(4) was amended to further re-
strict a prior limitation on the social-worker-client privilege, Op- Rm. STAT. § 40.230
(1991); Rule 505 was amended to abolish the husband-wife privilege where the husband
and wife are adverse parties in a civil proceeding, On. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (1991); Rule
604 was amended to change the word handicapped to disabled, On. Rev. STAT. § 40.320
(1991); Rule 606(1), which was entitled competency of Attorney as Witness, was re-
pealed, Or. Laws 1987, ch. 352.§ 1 (June 22, 1987); Rule 609 was amended by the Crime
Victim's Bill of Rights, 0. Rev. STAT. § 40.335 (1991); Rule 613 ,as amended to correct
a double negative in the provision, Op. Rev. STAT. § 40.380 (1991); Rule 615 as amended
by the Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, Op. Rxv. STAT. § 40.485 (1991); Rule 801 was
amended to add a statement made at a deposition to the list of non-hearsay statements,
OR. REv. STAT. § 40.450 (1991); Rule 803 was amended to add a hearsay exception for a
child victim of sexual assault, OR. REv. STAT. § 40.480 (1991); Rule 1005 was amended to
expand the circumstances under which a public record satisfied the best evidence rule,
O. REv. STAT. § 40.570 (1991).
= Nevada was so anxious to codify that it based its code on the Preliminary Draft
of the Federal Rules. Act of Apr. 22, 1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nev. Stat. 775.
309 See supra note 353.
31o See supra notes 354 & 356.
30, Nav. REv. STAT. §§ 47.020-52.395 (1979 & Supp 1991).
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not adversely effect criminal defendants.362 For instance, while
one section was amended nine times, only one substantive
change was made to permit a chemical expert in a drug case to
testify by affidavit to the chemical analysis of drugs. Two of
these efforts were addressed to this substantive change; the re-
maining seven made grammatical corrections.363 There is not a
single amendment in Nevada that seems to be the product of
public pressure in response to a particular verdict. Further, none
of the Nevada Code changes are very different from develop-
ments in other states by either the statutory or common law
process.
Looking to the substance of the amendments in all ten
states further suggests that the politicization fear is unfounded.
Most of the amendments have been technical changes, such as
gender," 4 or minor, neutral changes, such as expanding the defi-
nition of the doctor-patient privilege to include psychologists
and social workers.365 Some of the changes have even favored
defendants. Florida, which had not originally adopted Federal
Rule 404(a)(2) (permitting the defendant to offer evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of a crime victim), amended its law
in 1990 to permit such evidence. e36  This is not to say that the
prosecution has had no success. Notably, almost every state has
adopted statutes that make communications between rape vic-
tims and their counselors privileged38 7 and many have expanded
the admissibility of child/victim testimony.36 8 However, the
362 See, e.g., id. § 47.140 (Judicial Notice of Law) (which has been amended three
times). In 1973, it was amended to include judicial notice of municipal codes; in 1977, it
was amended to correct a change of name of a referenced provision; in 1985 it was
amended to permit judicial notice of Nevada Administrative code and regulations.
363 In 1975, paragraphs two and three were added to section 50.315 which provides
for the admissibility of an affidavit from chemical experts testifying in a drug case. Act
of May 13, 1975, ch. 431, 1975 Nev. Stat. 647. This amendment was amplified in 1983 to
define more clearly what information was admissible. Act of May 29, 1983, ch. 594, 1983
Nev. Stat. 1914. Other amendments to section 50.315 have been limited to changes in
grammar or punctuation. See Act of Apr. 25, 1973, ch. 555, 1973 Nev. Stat. 891; Act of
June 8, 1987, ch. 352, 1987 Nev. Stat, 798, and Act of June 18, 1987, ch, 658, 1987 Nov.
Stat. 1544.
:" See supra note 353.
65 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992).
366 Id. § 90.404.
317 See, e.g., id. § 90.5035.
"I6 See, e.g., ARa R. Evm. 803(25) (Michie 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West
1979 & Supp. 1992). Illinois, one of the seven remaining common law states, adopted a
statute specifically to admit this testimony and the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
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pressure to make these particular changes is intense and similar
changes have been made in uncodified states by both courts and
legislatures. 369 There is simply no way to guarantee that the leg-
islature will not enact rules that help prosecutors and hinder
criminal defendants. Whether such rules help or harm society is
another question. Whether a state has a code of evidence simply
does not determine the outcome of this process.
The experience in most codified jurisdictions, particularly
those modeled after the Federal Rules, is just the reverse. It may
be that the New York legislature is more likely than others to
react to public opinion. It may be that the history of codification
in the states is too short to predict confidently the legislative
response to codification over the long run. However, these pre-
liminary results do not suggest that codification of the law of
evidence will result in frequent, politically motivated, legislative
changes. The fear of emotional legislative responses should not
control the decision to codify since legislatures will respond to
public outcry whether or not the law of evidence is codified.
CONCLUSION
The battle to codify New York's law of evidence is certainly
not over. Codification can improve the quality of evidentiary ar-
guments and unify the law within the state. The current propo-
sal, although essentially a codification of existing common law,
does modernize and clarify a number of evidentiary rules. Codi-
fication will not limit judicial development of the law of evi-
dence. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the political process will
produce the havoc that opponents predict. The worst fears of
those opposed to the proposed New York code will not come to
pass; their clients will not be thrown to the mercies of a hostile
legislature that will decree more and more bad evidence law. In
other states those fears, by and large, have not been realized in
fifteen years of experience with codification of the national law
constitutionality of the provision. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 115-10 (1989); People v. Rocha, 547
N.E.2d 1335 (II. App. Ct. 1989).
" The New York legislature created a similar pro.victim statute in 1990 after
model Marla Hansen was brutally slashed across the face and was later confronted with
extraordinarily intrusive questioning during the trial of her assailant. N.Y. Cm. Pao.
LAW § 60.43 (McKinney 1992). See Kevin Sack, New York Limits Use of Sex History in
Trials, N.Y. Tms, July 31, 1990, at B3. The fact that New York had not codified its law
of evidence did not stop the legislature from acting in this instance.
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of evidence.
Furthermore, opponents of the code are winning a costly
pyrrhic victory. Even without a New York code, there is no pure
New York common law of evidence. To the contrary, the Federal
Rules of Evidence are fast becoming New York common law by
osmosis. The defense bar may find that it can more effectively
stem the perceived shift toward admissibility by joining the pro-
cess of drafting a code for New York. The result of this effort
will leave the defense bar better off in the war than in winning
the current battle.
